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1 Introduction
Jack the researcher takes a coin from his pocket and decides to flip it, say, one hundred times. As
he is curious about what outcome typically follows a heads, whenever he flips a heads he commits
to writing down the outcome of the next flip on the scrap of paper next to him. Upon completing
the one hundred flips, Jack of course expects the proportion of heads written on the scrap of paper
to be one-half. Shockingly, Jack is wrong. For a fair coin, the expected proportion of heads is
smaller than one-half.
We prove that for any finite sequence of binary data, in which each outcome of “success” or
“failure” is determined by an i.i.d. random variable, the proportion of successes among the outcomes
that immediately follow a streak of consecutive successes is expected to be strictly less than the
underlying (conditional) probability of success.1 While the magnitude of this streak selection bias
generally decreases as the sequence gets longer, it increases in streak length, and remains substantial
for a range of sequence lengths often used in empirical work.
We observe that the canonical study in the influential hot hand fallacy literature,2 Gilovich,
Vallone, and Tversky (1985), along with replications, have mistakenly employed a biased selection
procedure that is analogous to Jack’s.3 Upon conducting a de-biased analysis we find that the
long-standing conclusions of the canonical study are reversed.
To illustrate how the selection procedure that Jack uses in the opening example leads to a bias,
consider the simplest case in which he decides to flip the coin three times, rather than 100. In
this case there are only 23 = 8 possibilities for the single three-flip sequence that Jack will observe.
Column one of Table 1 lists these, with the respective flips that Jack would record (write down)
underlined for each possible sequence. Column two gives the respective proportion of heads on
recorded flips for each possible sequence. As Jack is equally likely to encounter each sequence, one
can see that the expected proportion is strictly less than 1/2, and in this case is 5/12.4 Notice
that because the sequence (rather than the flip) is the primitive outcome, the weight that the
(conditional) expectation places on each sequence’s associated proportion is independent of the
number of recorded flips.5
In Section 2 we prove the existence of the streak selection bias for the general case, then quantify
it with a formula that we provide. In the case of streaks of length k = 1 (as in the examples discussed
1The expectation is conditional on the appearance of at least one streak of k consecutive heads within the first n− 1
trials, where n ≥ 3 and 1 ≤ k < n− 1.
2The hot hand fallacy has been given considerable weight as a candidate explanation for various puzzles and behavioral
anomalies identified in the domains of financial markets, sports wagering, casino gambling, and lotteries (Arkes 2011;
Avery and Chevalier 1999; Barberis and Thaler 2003; Brown and Sauer 1993; Camerer 1989; Croson and Sundali
2005; De Bondt 1993; De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann 1991; Durham, Hertzel, and Martin 2005; Galbo-
Jørgensen, Suetens, and Tyran 2016; Guryan and Kearney 2008; Kahneman and Riepe 1998; Lee and Smith 2002; Loh
and Warachka 2012; Malkiel 2011; Narayanan and Manchanda 2012; Paul and Weinbach 2005; Rabin and Vayanos
2010; Sinkey and Logan 2013; Smith, Levere, and Kurtzman 2009; Sundali and Croson 2006; Xu and Harvey 2014;
2
Table 1: Column one lists the eight sequences that are possible for three flips of a fair coin. The proportion
of heads on the flips that immediately follow one or more heads is reported in Column two, for each sequence
that has at least one such flip. The (conditional) expectation of the proportion, which is simply its arithmetic
average across the six equally likely sequences for which it is defined, is reported in the bottom row.
Three flip Proportion of Hs
sequence on recorded flips
TTT -
TTH -
THT 0
HTT 0
THH 1
HTH 0
HHT 12
HHH 1
Expectation: 512
above) the formula admits a simple representation, and the bias is tightly related to a form of finite
sample bias that shows up in autoregressive coefficient estimators (Shaman and Stine 1988; Yule
1926).6 By contrast, for the more general case of k > 1 the streak selection bias is typically of
larger magnitude, and the formula does not appear to admit a simple representation.7 In this case
we provide a formula for the bias that is numerically tractable for sequence lengths commonly used
in the literature that we discuss.
The bias has important implications for the analysis of streak effects in the hot hand fallacy
literature. The fallacy refers to the conclusion of the seminal work of Gilovich, Vallone, and
Tversky (1985; henceforth GVT), in which the authors found that despite the near ubiquitous
belief among basketball fans and experts that there is momentum in shooting performance (“hot
Yuan, Sun, and Siu 2014).
3For an extensive survey of the hot hand fallacy literature see (Miller and Sanjurjo 2017a).
4The expectation is conditional on Jack having at least one flip to record.
5By contrast, if Jack were instead to observe multiple sequences generated from the same coin, then he could weight
each proportion according to its number of recorded flips when taking the average proportion across sequences. This
would result in a relatively smaller bias that vanishes in the limit (see Appendix A.2).
6In the context of time series regression this bias is known as the Hurwicz bias (Hurwicz 1950), which is exacerbated
when one introduces fixed effects into a time series model with few time periods (Nerlove 1967, 1971; Nickell 1981).
In Web Appendix F.1, we use a sampling-without-replacement argument to show that in the case of k = 1 the streak
selection bias, along with finite sample bias for autocorrelation (and time series), are essentially equivalent to: (i)
a form of selection bias known in the statistics literature as Berkson’s bias, or Berkson’s paradox (Berkson 1946;
Roberts, Spitzer, Delmore, and Sackett 1978), and (ii) several classic conditional probability puzzles.
7In Web Appendix D we show that the bias can be decomposed into two factors: a form of sampling-without-
replacement, and a stronger bias driven by the overlapping nature of the selection procedure. In Web Appendix F.2
we show how the bias due to the overlapping nature of the selection procedure is related to the overlapping words
paradox (Guibas and Odlyzko 1981).
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hand” or “streak” shooting) the conclusion from their statistical analyses was that momentum did
not exist.8 The result has long been considered a surprising and stark exhibit of irrational behavior,
as professional players and coaches have consistently rejected the conclusion, and its implications
for their decision making. Indeed, in the years since the seminal paper was published a consensus
has emerged that the hot hand is a “myth,” and the associated belief a “massive and widespread
cognitive illusion” (Kahneman 2011; Thaler and Sunstein 2008).
We find that GVT’s critical test of hot hand shooting is vulnerable to the bias for the following
simple reason: just as it is (surprisingly) incorrect to expect a fair coin flipped 100 times to yield
heads half of the time on those flips that immediately follow three consecutive heads, it is incorrect
to expect a consistent 50 percent (Bernoulli i.i.d.) shooter who has taken 100 shots to make half
of the shots that immediately follow a streak of three hits. Thus, after first replicating the original
results using GVT’s: (i) raw data, (ii) biased measures, and (iii) statistical tests, we perform a
bias correction to GVT’s measures, then repeat their statistical tests. We also run some additional
(unbiased) tests as robustness checks. In contrast with GVT’s results, the bias-corrected re-analysis
reveals significant evidence of streak shooting, with large effect sizes.
In a brief discussion of the related literature in Section 3, we first observe that the two repli-
cations of GVT (Avugos, Bar-Eli, Ritov, and Sher 2013a; Koehler and Conley 2003) are similarly
vulnerable to the bias. We illustrate how the results of Avugos et al. (2013a), a close replication
of GVT, similarly reverse when the bias is corrected for. Miller and Sanjurjo (2015b) show that
the results of Koehler and Conley (2003), which has been referred to as “an ideal situation in
which to study the hot hand” (Thaler and Sunstein 2008), reverse when an unbiased (and more
powered) analysis is performed. These results in turn agree with the unbiased analyses performed
on all remaining extant controlled shooting datasets in Miller and Sanjurjo (2014). Conservative
estimates of hot hand effect sizes are consistently moderate to large across studies.
It follows from these results that the hot hand is not a myth, and that the associated belief
is not a cognitive illusion. In addition, because researchers have: (i) accepted the null hypothesis
that players have a fixed probability of success, and (ii) treated the mere belief in the hot hand as
a cognitive illusion, the hot hand fallacy itself can be viewed as a fallacy.9
Finally, because the bias is subtle and (initially) surprising, even for people well-versed in
probability and statistics, those unaware of it may be susceptible to being misled, or exploited.10
8In particular, they observed that basketball shooting is “analogous to coin tossing” and “adequately described by
a simple binomial model.” From this, they concluded that the belief in the hot hand was both “erroneous” and “a
powerful and widely shared cognitive illusion” (Gilovich et al. 1985, pp.312–313)
9While our evidence reveals that belief in the hot hand is not a fallacy, it remains possible that those who believe in
the hot hand hold beliefs that are too strong (or too weak), or cannot accurately detect the hot hand when it occurs.
In Section 3.5 we briefly discuss existing evidence on beliefs.
10In informal conversations with researchers, and surveys of students, we have found a near-universal belief that the
sample proportion should be equal to the underlying probability, in expectation. The conviction with which these
beliefs are often held is notable, and reminiscent of the arguments that surrounded the classic Monty Hall problem
4
On the most basic level, it is possible that a na¨ıve observer could be convinced that negative
sequential dependence exists in an i.i.d. random process if sample size information (i.e. the number
of flips that Jack records) is obscured.11 More subtly, the bias can be leveraged to manipulate people
into believing that the outcomes of an unpredictable process can be predicted at rates better than
chance.12 Lastly, the bias can be applied in a straightforward way to construct gambling games
that appear actuarially fair, but are not.13
2 The Streak Selection Bias
Let X = {Xi}ni=1 be a sequence of binary random variables, with Xi = 1 a “success” and Xi = 0
a “failure.” A natural procedure for estimating the probability of success on trial t, conditional
on trial t immediately following k consecutive successes, is to first select the subset of trials that
immediately follow k consecutive successes Ik(X) := {i :
∏i−1
j=i−kXj = 1} ⊆ {k + 1, . . . , n}, then
calculate the proportion of successes on these trials.14 The following theorem establishes that when
{Xi}ni=1 is a sequence of i.i.d random variables, with probability of success p and fixed length n, this
procedure yields a biased estimator of the conditional probability, P(Xt = 1 |
∏t−1
j=t−kXj = 1) ≡ p.
Theorem 1 Let X = {Xi}ni=1, n ≥ 3, be a sequence of independent Bernoulli trials, each with
probability of success 0 < p < 1. Let Pˆk(X) be the proportion of successes on the subset of trials
Ik(X) that immediately follow k consecutive successes, i.e. Pˆk(X) :=
∑
i∈Ik(X)Xi/|Ik(X)|. Pˆk
is a biased estimator of P(Xt = 1 |
∏t−1
j=t−kXj = 1) ≡ p for all k such that 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 2. In
particular,
E
[
Pˆk(X)
∣∣∣ Ik(X) 6= ∅ ] < p (1)
Outline of Proof : In the proof contained in Appendix A we begin by showing that the conditional
expectation E[Pˆk(X)|Ik(X) 6= ∅] is equal to the conditional probability P(Xτ = 1|Ik(X) 6= ∅),
(Friedman 1998; Nalebuff 1987; Selvin 1975; Vos Savant 1990). See Miller and Sanjurjo (2015a) for more details on
the connection between the selection bias, the Monty Hall problem, and other conditional probability puzzles.
11In particular, Miller and Sanjurjo (2016) show that the bias introduced here, in conjunction with a quasi-Bayesian
model of decision making under sample size neglect (Benjamin, Rabin, and Raymond 2014; Griffin and Tversky 1992;
Kahneman and Tversky 1972), provides a novel structural candidate explanation for the persistence of gambler’s
fallacy beliefs.
12For example, suppose that a predictor observes successive realizations from a binary (or binarized) i.i.d. random
process (e.g. daily stock price movements), and is evaluated according to the success rate of her predictions over, say,
three months. If the predictor is given the freedom of when to predict, then she can exceed chance in her expected
success rate simply by predicting a reversal whenever there is a streak of consecutive outcomes of the same kind.
13A simple example is to sell the following lottery ticket for $5. A fair coin will be flipped 4 times. For each flip the
outcome will be recorded if and only if the previous flip is a heads. If the proportion of recorded heads is strictly
greater than one-half then the ticket pays $10; if the proportion is strictly less than one-half then the ticket pays $0;
if the proportion is exactly equal to one-half, or if no flip is immediately preceded by a heads, then a new sequence
of 4 flips is generated. While, intuitively, it seems that the expected value of the lottery must be $5, it is instead $4.
14In fact, this procedure yields the maximum likelihood estimate for P(Xt = 1 | ∏t−1j=t−kXj = 1).
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where τ is a trial drawn (uniformly) at random from the set of selected trials Ik(X). Next,
we show that for all eligible trials t ∈ Ik(X) we have that P(Xt = 1|τ = t, Ik(X) 6= ∅) ≤ p,
with the inequality strict for t < n, which implies that P(Xτ = 1|Ik(X) 6= ∅) < p. The strict
inequality for t < n follows from an application of Bayes’ rule. In particular, we observe that
P(Xt = 1|τ = t, Ik(X) 6= ∅) = P(Xt = 1|τ = t,
∏t−1
i=t−kXi = 1) ∝ P(τ = t|Xt = 1,
∏t−1
i=t−kXi =
1) × P(Xt = 1|
∏t−1
i=t−kXt = 1) = P(τ = t|Xt = 1,
∏t−1
i=t−kXt = 1) × p, and then argue that
P(τ = t|Xt = 1,
∏t−1
i=t−kXi = 1) < P(τ = t|Xt = 0,
∏t−1
i=t−kXi = 1) for t < n, which guarantees that
the likelihood ratio (updating factor) is less than one, and yields P(Xt = 1|τ = t,
∏t−1
i=t−kXi = 1) < p
for t < n. The intuition for why τ = t is more likely when Xt = 0 is the following: because the
streak of ones (
∏t−1
i=t−kXi = 1) is interrupted by Xt = 0, the next k trials are necessarily excluded
from the set Ik(X). This means that when Xt = 0 there are, on average, fewer eligible trials in
Ik(X) from which to draw (relative to when Xt = 1), which implies that any single trial is more
likely to be drawn.
In Web Appendix D we show that the downward bias can be decomposed into two factors: (i)
sampling-without-replacement: the restriction that the finite number of available successes places on
the procedure for selecting trials into Ik(X), and (ii) streak overlap: the additional, and stronger,
restriction that the arrangement of successes and failures in the sequence places on the procedure
for selecting trials into Ik(X).
Though Pˆk(X) is biased, it is straightforward to show that it is a consistent estimator of
P(Xt = 1 |
∏t−1
j=t−kXj = 1).
15,16
2.1 Quantifying the bias.
In Web Appendix E.2 we provide a formula that can be used to calculate E[ Pˆk(X) | Ik(X) 6= ∅ ].
For the special case of k = 1 a closed form exists, which we provide in Appendix A.3. There does
not appear to be a simple representation for k > 1.
Figure 1 contains a plot of E[ Pˆk(X) | Ik(X) 6= ∅ ], as a function of the number of trials in the
sequence n, and for different values of k and p. The dotted lines in the figure represent the true
probability of success for p = 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75, respectively. The five solid lines immediately
below each dotted line represent the respective expected proportions for each value of k = 1, 2, . . . , 5.
Observe that while the bias does generally decrease as n increases, it can remain substantial even
15See Appendix A.2 for a proof.
16It is possible to devise alternative estimators of the conditional probability that are unbiased. To illustrate, if the
researcher were instead to control the number of selected trials by repeating the experiment until he generates exactly
m trials that immediately follow k consecutive successes, then the proportion would be unbiased. Alternatively, if the
researcher were to eliminate the overlapping nature of the measure, there would be no bias, even though the number
of selected trials would still be random. In particular, for a sequence of n trials, one can take each run of successes,
and if it is of even length 2`, divide it into blocks of two trials; if it is of odd length 2`− 1 include the right adjacent
tails and divide it into blocks of two trials. In each case, the run of successes contributes ` observations.
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Figure 1: The expected value of the proportion of successes on trials that immediately follow k consecutive
successes, Pˆk(X), as a function of the total number of trials n, for different values of k and probabilities of
success p, using the formula provided in Web Appendix E.
for long sequences. For example, in the case of n = 100, p = 0.5, and k = 5, the magnitude of the
bias is .35 − .50 = −0.15, and in the case of n = 100, p = 0.25, and k = 3, the magnitude of the
bias is .16− .25 = −0.09.17
3 Application to the Hot Hand Fallacy
This account explains both the formation and maintenance of the erroneous belief in
the hot hand: if random sequences are perceived as streak shooting, then no amount
of exposure to such sequences will convince the player, the coach, or the fan that the
sequences are in fact random. (Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky [GVT] 1985)
17The non-monotonicity in n of the curves presented in Figure 1 arises because for any streak length k there is no
bias when n = k + 1 (because there are only two feasible sequences, which are equally likely), or in the limit (see
Appendix A.2).
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In their seminal paper GVT find no evidence of hot hand shooting in their analysis of basketball
shooting data, despite the near-unanimous belief in the hot hand among players, coaches, and fans.
As a result, they conclude that belief in the hot hand is a “powerful and widely shared cognitive
illusion.” (p. 313).
3.1 GVT’s analysis
Empirical approach
GVT’s “Analysis of Conditional Probabilities” is their main test of hot hand shooting, and provides
their only measure of the magnitude of the hot hand effect. The goal of their analysis is to determine
whether a player’s hit probability is higher following a streak of hits than it is following a streak
of misses.18 To this end, GVT reported each player i’s shooting percentage conditional on having:
(1) hit the last k shots, Pˆ i(hit|k hits), and (2) missed the last k shots, Pˆ i(hit|k misses), for streak
lengths k = 1, 2, 3 (Table 4, p. 307).19 After informally comparing these shooting percentages for
individual players, GVT performed a paired t-test of whether E[Pˆ i(hit|k hits)−Pˆ i(hit|k misses)] =
0, for k = 1, 2, 3.20,21
In the remainder of this section, we focus our discussion on streaks of length three (or more), as
in, e.g. Koehler and Conley (2003); Rao (2009b), given that: (i) shorter streak lengths exacerbate
attenuation bias due to measurement error (see Footnote 21 and Appendix B), and (ii) people
typically perceive streaks as beginning with the third successive event (Carlson and Shu 2007). In
any case, robustness checks using different streak lengths yield similar results (see Footnotes 29
and 33 in Section 3.3).
18GVT explicitly treat hot hand and streak shooting as synonymous (Gilovich et al. 1985, pp. 296-297). Miller and
Sanjurjo (2014) provide an analysis that distinguishes between hot hand and cold hand shooting, and find hot hand
shooting across all extant controlled shooting datasets, but little in the way of cold hand shooting. Thus, in the
present analysis we use the terms streakiness and hot hand shooting interchangeably.
19We abuse our notation from Section 2 here in order to facilitate comparison with GVT’s analysis: we use Pˆ i(hit|k hits)
for both the random variable Pˆk(X) and its realization Pˆk(x). Similarly, we use Pˆ
i(hit|k misses) for the proportion
of successes on trials that immediately follow k consecutive failures.
20Under the null hypothesis the difference between each i’s pair of shooting percentages is drawn from a normal
distribution with mean zero.
21While GVT’s analysis of conditional probabilities provides their only measure of the magnitude of the hot hand, they
also analyze the number of runs, serial correlation, and variation of shooting percentage in 4-shot windows. Miller
and Sanjurjo (2014) show that the runs and serial correlation tests, along with the conditional probability test for
k = 1, all amount to roughly the same test, and moreover, that they are not sufficiently powered to identify hot
hand shooting. The reason why is due to measurement error: the act of hitting a single shot is only a weak signal
of a change in a player’s underlying probability of success, which leads to an attenuation bias in the estimate of the
increase in the probability of success associated with entering the hot state (see Appendix B and Stone (2012)’s work
on measurement error when estimating autocorrelation in ability). The test of variation in 4-shot windows is even
less powered than the aforementioned tests (Miller and Sanjurjo 2014; Wardrop 1999).
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Data
GVT analyze shot sequences from basketball players in three contexts: NBA field goal data, NBA
free-throw data, and a controlled shooting experiment with NCAA collegiate players. The shooting
experiment was GVT’s controlled test of hot hand shooting, designed for the purpose of “eliminating
the effects of shot selection and defensive pressure” (p. 34), which makes it central to their main
conclusions. Thus, we focus on this data below when discussing the relevance of the bias to GVT’s
results.22,23
In GVT’s controlled shooting experiment 26 players from the Cornell University Mens’ (14)
and Womens’ (12) basketball teams participated in an incentivized shooting task. Each player shot
100 times at a distance from which the experimenters determined he/she would make around 50
percent of the shots. Following each shot the player had to change positions along two symmetric
arcs—one facing the basket from the left, and the other from the right.
Results
In Columns 4 and 5 of Table 2 we use the raw data from GVT to reproduce the shooting percentages,
Pˆ i(hit|3 hits) and Pˆ i(hit|3 misses), for each of the 26 players (these are identical to Columns 2
and 8 of Table 4 in GVT). As indicated in GVT, players on average hit .49 when on a hit streak,
versus .45 when on a miss streak. GVT’s paired t-test finds the difference to be statistically
indistinguishable from zero, and we replicate this result (p = .49).
3.2 The bias in GVT’s analysis
While GVT’s null hypothesis that E[Pˆ i(hit|k hits)−Pˆ i(hit|k misses)] = 0 seems intuitively correct
for a consistent shooter with a fixed probability of success pi (i.i.d. Bernoulli), Theorem 1 reveals a
22From the statistical point of view, the in-game field goal data that GVT analyze (Study 2: 76ers, 1980-81 season: 9
players, 48 home games) is not ideal for the study of hot hand shooting for reasons that are unrelated to the bias. The
most notable concern with in-game field goal data is that the opposing team has incentive to make costly strategic
adjustments to mitigate the impact of the “hot” player (Dixit and Nalebuff 1991, p. 17). This concern has been
emphasized by researchers in the hot hand literature (Aharoni and Sarig 2011; Green and Zwiebel 2017), and is not
merely theoretical, as it has a strong empirical basis. While GVT observed that a shooter’s field goal percentage is
lower after consecutive successes, subsequent studies have shown that with even partial controls for defensive pressure
(and shot location), this effect is eliminated (Bocskocsky, Ezekowitz, and Stein 2014; Rao 2009a). Further, evidence
of specific forms of strategic adjustment has been documented (Aharoni and Sarig 2011; Bocskocsky et al. 2014). See
Miller and Sanjurjo (2014) for further details.
23The in-game free throw data that GVT analyze (Study 3: Celtics, 1980-81, 1981-82 seasons: 9 players), while arguably
controlled, is not ideal for the study of hot hand shooting for a number of reasons: (i) hitting the first shot in a
pair of isolated shots is not typically regarded by fans and players as hot hand shooting (Koehler and Conley 2003),
presumably due to the high prior probability of success (≈ .75), (ii) hitting a single shot is a weak signal of a player’s
underlying state, which can lead to severe measurement error (Arkes 2013; Stone 2012), (iii) it is vulnerable to an
omitted variable bias, as free throw pairs are relatively rare, and shots must be aggregated across games and seasons
in order to have sufficient sample size (Miller and Sanjurjo 2014). In any event, subsequent studies of free throw
data have found evidence that is inconsistent with the conclusions that GVT drew from the Celtics’ data (Aharoni
and Sarig 2011; Arkes 2010; Goldman and Rao 2012; Miller and Sanjurjo 2014; Wardrop 1995; Yaari and Eisenmann
2011).
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Table 2: Columns 4 and 5 reproduce the shooting percentages and number of shots that appear in Table 4,
Columns 2 and 8, from Gilovich et al. (1985) (note: 3 hits (misses) includes streaks of 3, 4, 5, etc.). Column
6 reports the difference between the proportions (using the raw data), and column 7 adjusts for the bias (mean
correction), based on each player’s shooting percentage (probability in this case) and number of shots.
Dˆ3 := Pˆ (hit|3 hits)− Pˆ (hit|3 misses)
Player # shots Pˆ (hit) Pˆ (hit|3 hits) Pˆ (hit|3 misses) GVT est. bias adj.
Males
1 100 .54 .50 (12) .44 (9) .06 .14
2 100 .35 .00 (3) .43 (28) −.43 −.33
3 100 .60 .60 (25) .67 (6) −.07 .02
4 90 .40 .33 (3) .47 (15) −.13 −.03
5 100 .42 .33 (6) .75 (12) −.42 −.33
6 100 .57 .65 (23) .25 (12) .40 .48
7 75 .56 .65 (17) .29 (7) .36 .47
8 50 .50 .57 (7) .50 (6) .07 .24
9 100 .54 .83 (30) .35 (20) .48 .56
10 100 .60 .57 (21) .57 (7) .00 .09
11 100 .58 .62 (21) .57 (7) .05 .14
12 100 .44 .43 (7) .41 (17) .02 .10
13 100 .61 .50 (18) .40 (5) .10 .19
14 100 .59 .60 (20) .50 (6) .10 .19
Females
1 100 .48 .33 (9) .67 (9) −.33 −.25
2 100 .34 .40 (5) .43 (28) −.03 .07
3 100 .39 .50 (8) .36 (25) .14 .23
4 100 .32 .33 (3) .27 (30) .07 .17
5 100 .36 .20 (5) .22 (27) −.02 .08
6 100 .46 .29 (7) .54 (11) −.26 −.18
7 100 .41 .62 (13) .32 (25) .30 .39
8 100 .53 .73 (15) .67 (9) .07 .15
9 100 .45 .50 (8) .46 (13) .04 .12
10 100 .46 .71 (14) .32 (19) .40 .48
11 100 .53 .39 (13) .50 (10) −.12 −.04
12 100 .25 .− (0) .32 (37) . .
Average .47 .49 .45 .03 .13
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flaw in this reasoning. In particular, we have established that Pˆ i(hit|k hits) is expected to be less
than pi, and Pˆ i(hit|k misses) greater than pi (by symmetry). In fact, in Appendix A.4 we show
that the difference Pˆ i(hit|k hits)− Pˆ i(hit|k misses) is not only expected to be negative, but that
its magnitude is more than double the bias in either of the respective proportions.24
Under GVT’s design target of each player taking n = 100 shots and making half (p = .5) of
them, we use the results from Section 2 and Appendix A.4 to find that the expected difference (and
the strength of the bias) is -8 percentage points.25 Therefore, the difference between the average
proportion of +4 percentage points observed by GVT is actually +12 percentage points higher
than the difference that would be expected from a Bernoulli i.i.d. shooter. Thus, the bias has long
disguised evidence in GVT’s data that may well indicate hot hand shooting.
3.3 A bias-corrected statistical analysis of GVT
A straightforward way to adjust for the bias in GVT’s analysis is simply to shift the difference
for each shooter by the amount of the corresponding bias, then repeat their paired t-test. While
this test yields a statistically significant result (p < .05), the paired t-test limits statistical power
because it reduces each player’s performance to a single number, ignoring the number of shots that
the player attempted in each category, i.e. “3 hits” and “3 misses.” In addition, adjusting for the
bias based on the assumption that p = .5 assumes that GVT’s design target was met precisely.
As a result, for each player we again compute the bias under the null hypothesis that trials
are i.i.d. Bernoulli (i.e. “consistent” shooting) but now with a probability of success equal to the
player’s observed shooting percentage (Column 3 of Table 2), and using the number of shots taken
in each category to inform our standard errors. With this approach the average difference goes from
+3 to a considerable +13 percentage points (p < .01, S.E. = 4.7pp).26,27 To put the magnitude of
+13 percentage points into perspective, the difference between the median three point shooter and
the top three point shooter in the 2015-2016 NBA season was 12 percentage points.28 Further, this
is a conservative estimate because in practice the data generating processes (i.e. shooters) clearly
24That the difference is expected to be negative does not follow immediately from Theorem 1, as the set of sequences for
which the difference is well-defined is a strict subset of the set corresponding to either of the respective proportions.
Nevertheless, the reasoning of the proof is similar. See Theorem 3 of Appendix A.4.
25See Figure 4 in Appendix A.4 for the bias in the difference as n, p and k vary.
26The standard error is computed based on the assumption of independence across the 2600 trials, and normality. In
particular, defining player i’s difference Dˆik := Pˆ
i(hit|k hits) − Pˆ i(hit|k misses), the variance satisfies V̂ ar(Dˆik) =
V̂ ar(Pˆ i(hit|k hits)) + V̂ ar(Pˆ i(hit|k misses)) for each player i. Simulations reveal that the associated (1−α)×100%
confidence intervals with radius zα/2× V̂ ar(D¯k)1/2 (where the mean difference is given by D¯k := (1/n)
∑n
i=1 Dˆ
i
k) have
the appropriate coverage—i.e. (1−α/2)×100% of the time the true difference is greater than D¯k−zα/2×V̂ ar(D¯k)1/2,
for both Bernoulli trials and the positive feedback model discussed in Section B.
27For an alternative approach that involves pooling shots across players, and yields similar results, see Appendix C.
28ESPN, “NBA Player 3-Point Shooting Statistics - 2015-16.” http://www.espn.com/nba/statistics/player/ /stat/3-
points [accessed September 24, 2016].
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Figure 2: The bias-corrected difference Dˆi3 = Pˆ
i(hit|3 hits)− Pˆ i(hit|3 misses) for each player, under the
assumption that his/her probability of success is equal to his/her overall shooting percentage.
differ from i.i.d. Bernoulli trials, and the bias becomes much larger under various models of hot
hand shooting because of measurement error (see Appendix B).
GVT also informally discussed the heterogeneity across players, and asserted that most players
shot relatively better when on a streak of misses than when on a streak of hits. By contrast, Fig-
ure 2 shows that once the bias correction is made to the differences 19 of the 25 players directionally
exhibit hot hand shooting, which is itself significant (p < .01, binomial test).29 Further, as indi-
cated by the confidence intervals, t-tests reveal that 5 of the players exhibit statistically significant
evidence of hot hand shooting (p < .05, t-test), which, for a set of 25 independent tests, is itself
significant (p < .01, binomial test).
29Repeating the tests for longer (k = 4) or shorter (k = 2) streak lengths yields similar results that are consistent with
the attenuation bias in estimated effect sizes discussed in Footnote 21. In particular, If we instead define a streak
as beginning with 4 consecutive hits, which is a stronger signal of hot hand shooting, then the average bias-adjusted
difference in proportions is 10 percentage points (p = .07, S.E. = 6.9, one-sided test), and four players exhibit
statistically significant hot hand shooting (p < .05), which is itself significant (p < .01, binomial test). On the other
hand, if we define a streak as beginning with 2 consecutive hits, which is a weaker signal of hot hand shooting, then
the average bias-adjusted difference in proportions is 5.4 percentage points (p < .05, S.E. = 3, one-sided test), and
four players exhibit statistically significant hot hand shooting (p < .05), which is itself significant (p < .01, binomial
test).
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Figure 3: The histogram and kernel density plot of the (exact) discrete probability distribution of
Pˆ i(ahit|k hits) − Pˆ i(hit|k misses), for a single player i with n = 100 and n1 = 50, using a variant of
the formula for the distribution provided in Web Appendix E.2 (see supplementary materials).31
Non-parametric robustness test
As a robustness check we perform permutation tests, which are (by construction) invulnerable to
the bias. The null hypothesis for a permutation test is that a player is a consistent shooter, i.e. has
an i.i.d. fixed (unknown) probability of success. The first step to test for streak shooting in player
i is to observe his/her shot sequence and compute the difference in proportions, Pˆ i(hit|k hits) −
Pˆ i(hit|k misses). The second step is to compute this difference for each unique rearrangement of
the observed sequence; each of these permutations is equally likely because player i’s probability of
success is fixed under the null hypothesis.30 The set of unique differences computed in the second
step, along with their associated relative frequencies, constitutes the exact sampling distribution
of the difference under the null hypothesis (conditional on the observed number of hits). This
distribution can then be used for statistical testing (See Appendix C.2 for details). The distribution
is negative-skewed, and can be represented by histograms such as the one shown in Figure 3, which
provides the exact distribution for a player who has hit 50 out of 100 shots.
Results of the permutation tests agree with those of the bias-corrected tests reported above. In
particular, the average difference across shooters indicates hot hand shooting with a similar level of
30Thus, the permutation procedure directly implements GVT’s idea of comparing a “player’s performance. . . to a
sequence of hits and misses generated by tossing a coin” (Gilovich et al. 1985, p. 296)
31Uses a bin width of 4 percentage points. The values for the difference are grouped based on the first 6 decimal digits
of precision. For this precision, the more than 1029 distinguishable sequences take on 19,048 distinct values. In the
computation of the expected value in Figures 1 and 4, each difference is instead represented with the highest floating
point precision available.
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significance (p < .01).32 Also as before, 5 individual players exhibit significant hot hand shooting
(p < .01, binomial test).33
3.4 The hot hand (and bias) in other controlled and semi-controlled studies
A close replication of GVT’s controlled shooting experiment is found in Avugos et al. (2013a), a
study that mimics GVT’s design and analysis, but with olympian rather than collegiate players,
and fewer shots (n = 40) per player. From the authors’ Table 1 (p. 6), one can derive the average
pˆ(hit|3 hits) and pˆ(hit|3 misses) across players, which are roughly .52 and .54, respectively, yielding
an average difference in shooting percentages of -2 percentage points.34 However, Figure 4 in
Appendix A.4 shows that the strength of the bias for n = 40 shots and p = .5 (the design target) is
-.20. Thus, once the bias is corrected for in this small sample the average difference across shooters
becomes roughly +18 percentage points.35
Koehler and Conley (2003) test for the hot hand in the NBA three point shooting contest,
which has been described as an ideal setting in which to study the hot hand (Thaler and Sunstein
2008). The authors find no evidence of hot hand shooting in their analysis of four years of data.
However, as in GVT and Avugos et al. (2013a), the conditional probability tests that the authors
conduct are vulnerable to the bias. By contrast, Miller and Sanjurjo (2015b) collect 28 years of
data, which yields 33 players that have taken at least 100 shots; using this dataset, we find that the
average bias-corrected difference across players is +8 percentage points (p < .01).36 Further, 8 of
the 33 players exhibit significant hot hand shooting (p < .05), which itself is statistically significant
(p < .001, binomial test).
The only other controlled shooting studies that we are aware of are Jagacinski, Newell, and Isaac
(1979) and Miller and Sanjurjo (2014).37,38 Both studies have few shooters (6 and 8, respectively)
but many shots across multiple shooting sessions for each player (540 and 900+ shots, respectively).
32The procedure in this pooled test involves stratifying the permutations by player. In particular, we conduct a test of
the average of the standardized difference, where for each player the difference is standardized by shifting its mean
and scaling its variance under H0. In this case H0: P(success on trial t for player i) = pi for all t, i.
33As in Footnote 29, the results of the permutation test are robust to varying streak length k.
34We could not analyze the raw data because the authors declined to provide it to us. The data that represents a
close replication of GVT is from the betting game phase. Using Table 1, we have pˆ(hit|3 hits) = (.56 + .52)/2 and
pˆ(hit|3 misses) = (.54 + .49)/2, which is the average of the shooting percentage of Group A in Phase 1 with that of
Group B from Phase 2.
35The authors also had another treatment, in which they had shooters rate, before each shot, from 0-100% on a certainty
scale whether they would hit the next shot. If we repeat the analysis on the data from this treatment then the average
pˆ(hit|3 hits) and pˆ(hit|3 misses) across players are roughly .56 and .65, respectively, yielding an average difference
of -9 percentage points, and a bias-adjusted difference of +11 percentage points.
36Miller and Sanjurjo (2015b) also implement the unbiased permutation test procedure of Section 3.3.
37The one exception is a controlled shooting study that involved a single shooter Wardrop (1999). After personal
communication with the shooter, who conducted the study herself (recording her own shots), we viewed it as not
having sufficient control to warrant analysis.
38We thank Tom Gilovich for bringing the study of Jagacinski et al. to our attention. It had gone uncited in the hot
hand literature until Miller and Sanjurjo (2014).
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The bias-adjusted average difference in the studies are +7 and +4 percentage points, respectively.
In addition, Miller and Sanjurjo (2014) find substantial and persistent evidence of hot hand shooting
in individual players.39
Thus, once the bias is accounted for, conservative estimates of hot hand effect sizes across all
extant controlled and semi-controlled shooting studies are consistently moderate to large.40
3.5 Belief in the Hot Hand
The results of our reanalysis of GVT’s data lead us to a conclusion that is the opposite of theirs:
belief in the hot hand is not a cognitive illusion. Nevertheless, it remains possible, perhaps even
likely, that professional players and coaches sometimes infer the presence of a hot hand when it
does not exist. Similarly, even when in the presence of the hot hand, players may overestimate its
influence and respond too strongly to it. By contrast, a hot hand might also go undetected, or
be underestimated (Stone and Arkes 2017). These questions are important because understanding
the extent to which decision makers’ beliefs and behavior do not correspond to the actual degree
of hot hand shooting could have considerable implications for decision-making more generally.
While GVT’s main conclusion was of a binary nature, i.e. based on the question of whether
belief in the hot hand is either fallacious or not, they explored hot hand beliefs via a survey of
player and coach beliefs, and an incentivized betting task with the Cornell players. In the survey
they find that the near universal beliefs in the hot hand do not accord with the lack of hot hand
shooting evidence that resulted from their analysis of the shooting data, and in the betting task
they found that players were incapable of predicting upcoming shot outcomes successfully, which
suggests that even if there were a hot hand, it could not be detected successfully.
However, in light of the results presented in the present paper subjects’ responses in GVT’s un-
incentivized survey are actually qualitatively consistent with the evidence presented above.41 More
substantively, GVT’s statistical analysis of betting data has recently been shown to be consider-
ably underpowered, as the authors conduct many separate individual bettor level tests rather than
pooling the data across bettors (Miller and Sanjurjo 2017b). In addition, GVT misinterpret their
39See Avugos, Ko¨ppen, Czienskowski, Raab, and Bar-Eli (2013b) for a meta-analysis of the hot hand, which includes
sports besides basketball. Tversky and Gilovich (1989) argue that evidence for the hot hand in other sports is not
relevant to their main conclusion because so long as the hot hand does not exist in basketball, then the perception of
the hot hand by fans, players and coaches must necessarily be a cognitive illusion (see also Alter and Oppenheimer
[2006]).
40The magnitudes of all estimated effect sizes are conservative for two reasons: (i) if a player’s probability of success
is not driven merely by feedback from previous shots, but also by other time-varying player (and environment)
specific factors, then the act of hitting consecutive shots will serve as only a noisy proxy of the hot state, resulting
in measurement error, and an attenuation bias in the estimate (see Appendix B), and (ii) if the effect of consecutive
successes on subsequent success is heterogenous in magnitude (and sign) across players, then an average measure will
underestimate how strong the effect can be in certain players.
41See Appendix B of Miller and Sanjurjo (2017b) for details.
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measures of bettors’ ability to predict. In light of these limitations, Miller and Sanjurjo (2017b)
reanalyze GVT’s betting data, and find that players on average shoot around +7 percentage points
higher when bettors have predicted that the shot will be a hit, rather than a miss (p < .001). This
increase is comparable in magnitude to an NBA shooter going from slightly above average to elite
in three point percentage.42
Miller and Sanjurjo (2014) present complementary evidence on beliefs, in which semi-professional
players rank their teammates’ respective increases in shooting percentage when on a streak of three
hits (relative to their base rates) in a shooting experiment that the rankers do not observe. Play-
ers’ rankings are found to be highly correlated with their teammates’ actual increases in shooting
percentage in this out-of-sample test, yielding an average correlation of -0.60 (p < .0001; where 1
is the rank of the shooter with the perceived largest percentage point increase).
In sum, while it remains possible that professional players’ and coaches’ hot hand beliefs are
poorly calibrated, this claim is not clearly supported by the existing body of evidence.
4 Conclusion
We prove the existence of, and quantify, a novel form of selection bias that counter-intuitively arises
in some particularly simple analyses of sequential data. A key implication of the bias is that the
empirical approach of the canonical hot hand fallacy paper, and its replications, are incorrect. Upon
correcting for the bias we find that the data that had previously been interpreted as demonstrating
that belief in the hot hand is a fallacy, instead provides substantial evidence that it is not a fallacy
to believe in the hot hand.
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A Appendix: Section 2 Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1 (Section 2)
Define F := {x ∈ {0, 1}n : Ik(x) 6= ∅} to be the sample space of sequences for which Pˆk(X) is well
defined. The probability distribution over F is given by P(A|F ) := P(A∩F )/P(F ) for A ⊆ {0, 1}n,
where P(X = x) = p
∑n
i=1 xi(1− p)n−
∑n
i=1 xi .
Let the random variable Xτ represent the outcome of the randomly “drawn” trial τ , which is
selected as a result of the two-stage procedure that: (i) draws a sequence x at random from F ,
according to the distribution P(X = x|F ), and (ii) draws a trial τ at random from {k + 1, . . . , n},
according to the distribution P(τ = t|X = x). Let τ be a uniform draw from the trials in sequence
X that immediately follow k consecutive successes, i.e. for x ∈ F , P(τ = t|X = x) = 1/|Ik(x)|
for t ∈ Ik(x), and P(τ = t|X = x) = 0 for t ∈ Ik(x)C ∩ {k + 1, . . . , n}.43 It follows that the
unconditional probability distribution of τ over all trials that can possibly follow k consecutive
successes is given by P(τ = t|F ) = ∑x∈F P(τ = t|X = x, F )P(X = x|F ), for t ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n}.
The probability that this randomly drawn trial is a success, P(Xτ = 1|F ), must be equal to the
expected proportion, E[Pˆk(X)|F ].44
Note that P(Xτ = 1|F ) =
∑n
t=k+1 P(Xt = 1|τ = t, F )P(τ = t|F ), and P(τ = t|F ) > 0 for
t ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n}. Below, we demonstrate that P(Xt = 1|τ = t, F ) < p when t < n, and that
P(Xt = 1|τ = n, F ) = p, which, taken together, guarantee that P(Xτ = 1|F ) < p.
First we observe that P(Xt = 1|τ = t, F ) = P(Xt = 1|τ = t, Ft), where Ft := {x ∈ {0, 1}n :∏t−1
i=t−kxi = 1}. Bayes Rule then yields:
P(Xt = 1|τ = t, Ft)
P(Xt = 0|τ = t, Ft) =
P (τ = t |Xt = 1, Ft )
P (τ = t |Xt = 0, Ft )
P(Xt = 1|Ft)
P(Xt = 0|Ft)
=
P (τ = t |Xt = 1, Ft )
P (τ = t |Xt = 0, Ft )
p
1− p.
Therefore, for the case of t ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n − 1}, in order to show that P(Xt = 1|τ = t, F ) =
P(Xt = 1|τ = t, Ft) < p it suffices to show that P(τ = t|Xt = 1, Ft) < P(τ = t|Xt = 0, Ft), which
follows below:
43For x ∈ FC no trial is drawn, which we can represent as P(τ = 1|X = x) = 1 (for example).
44The identity follows by the law of total probability, with the key observation that Pˆk(x) =
∑
t∈Ik(x) xt ·
1
|Ik(x)| =∑n
t=k+1 P(Xt = 1|τ = t,X = x, F )P(τ = t|X = x, F ).
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P(τ = t|Xt = 0, Ft) =
∑
x∈Ft:xt=0
P(τ = t|Xt = 0,X = x, Ft)P(X = x|Xt = 0, Ft)
=
∑
x∈Ft:xt=0
P(τ = t|Xt = 0,X−t = x−t, Ft)P(X−t = x−t|Xt = 0, Ft) (2)
>
∑
x∈Ft:xt=0
P(τ = t|Xt = 1,X−t = x−t, Ft)P(X−t = x−t|Xt = 1, Ft) (3)
=
∑
x∈Ft:xt=1
P(τ = t|Xt = 1,X = x, Ft)P(X = x|Xt = 1, Ft)
=P(τ = t|Xt = 1, Ft)
where in (2), given x, we define x−t := (x1, . . . , xt−1, xt+1, . . . , xn). To obtain the inequality in (3)
we observe that: (i) P(X−t = x−t|Xt = 0, Ft) = P(X−t = x−t|Xt = 1, Ft) because X is a sequence
of i.i.d. Bernoulli trials, and (ii) P(τ = t|Xt = 1,X−t = x−t, Ft) < P(τ = t|Xt = 0,X−t = x−t, Ft)
because τ is drawn at random (uniformly) from the set Ik(x), which contains at least one more
element (trial t+ 1) if xt = 1 rather than xt = 0.
For the case of t = n we follow the above steps until (3), at which point an equality now emerges
as Xn = 1 no longer yields an additional trial from which to draw, because trial n is terminal. This
implies that P(τ = n|Xn = 1, Fn) = P(τ = n|Xn = 0, Fn).
Taking these two facts together: (i) P(Xt = 1|τ = t, F ) < p, for k + 1 ≤ t < n, and (ii)
P(Xn = 1|τ = n, F ) = p, it immediately follows that P(Xτ = 1|F ) < p.45

A.2 Asymptotic Unbiasedness
Proof that the proportion is asymptotically unbiased
To demonstrate that Pˆk(X) is a consistent estimator of P(Xt = 1|
∏t−1
j=t−kXj = 1), first define
Yk,i :=
∏i
j=i−k+1Xj for i ≥ k. With this, Pˆk(X) =
∑n
i=k+1 Yk+1,i/
∑n−1
i=k Yk,i. Note that each of the
respective sequences {Yk,i}, {Yk+1,i} are asymptotically uncorrelated (k fixed). Therefore, their time
averages converge to their respective means almost surely, i.e. 1/(n−k)∑n−1i=k Yk,i a.s.−→ E[Yk,i] = pk,
and 1/(n−k)∑ni=k+1 Yk+1,i a.s.−→ E[Yk+1,i] = pk+1.46 The continuous mapping theorem implies that
Pˆk(X)
a.s.−→ p = P(Xt = 1 |
∏t−1
j=t−kXj = 1), which in turn implies consistency.
45Note that the proof does not require that the Bernoulli trials be identically distributed. Instead, we could allow
the probability distribution to vary, with P(Xi = 1) = pi for i = 1, . . . , n, in which case our result would be that
P(Xτ = 1|F ) < E[pτ |F ].
46See Definition 3.55 and Theorem 3.57 from White (1999).
23
Proof that weighted proportions are asymptotically unbiased
In order to prove the assertion made in Footnote 5 that the weighted average proportion over
multiple realized sequences is a consistent estimator of P(Xt = 1|
∏t−1
j=t−kXj = 1), we first define
Yk,i :=
∏i
j=i−k+1Xj for i ≥ k, just as we did in the previous proof. Then, we note that: (i)
the number of trials that follow k consecutive successes in the weighted proportion taken over T
sequences is given by
∑T
t=1 Zk,t, where Zk,t =
∑nt−1
i=n(t−1)+k Yk,i, and (ii) the number of successes
on these trials is given by
∑T
t=1 Zk+1,t, where Zk+1,t =
∑nt
i=n(t−1)+k+1 Yk+1,i. Because Zk,t are
i.i.d. with E[Zk,t] = (n − k)pk, it follows that 1/T
∑T
t=1 Zk,t
a.s.−→ E[Zk,t] = (n − k)pk; similarly,
1/T
∑T
t=1 Zk+1,t
a.s.−→ E[Zk+1,t] = (n − k)pk+1. Then, the continuous mapping theorem yields the
desired consistency of the weighted proportion (after sequence T ), i.e.
∑T
t=1 Zk+1,t/
∑T
t=1 Zk,t
a.s.−→
p = P(Xt = 1 |
∏t−1
j=t−kXj = 1).
A.3 Formula for the expected proportion (special case of k = 1)
The following lemma shows that the expected proportion Pˆ1(X), conditional on a known number
of successes N1(X) = n1, satisfies the sampling-without-replacement formula, which for any given
trial is less than the probability of success P(Xi|N1(X) = n1) = n1n .
Lemma 1 Let n > 1. Then
E
[
Pˆ1(X)
∣∣∣ I1(X) 6= ∅, N1(X) = n1 ] = n1 − 1
n− 1 (4)
for 0 ≤ n1 ≤ n.
Proof: As in the proof of Theorem 1, let τ be drawn at random from I1(X), which is non-empty
when N1(X) = n1 ≥ 2 (the result is trivial when n1 = 1). In order to ease notation we let
probability P(·) represent the conditional probability P(·|N1(X) = n1), which is defined over the
subsets of {x ∈ {0, 1}n : N1(x) = n1}.
E[Pˆ1(X)|N1(X) = n1, I1(X) 6= ∅] = P(Xτ = 1) (5)
= P(Xτ = 1|τ < n)P(τ < n) + P(Xn = 1|τ = n)P(τ = n)
=
n−1∑
t=2
P(Xt = 1|τ = t) 1
n− 1 + P(Xn = 1|τ = n)
1
n− 1 (6)
=
n− 1
n− 2
(
n1
n
− 1
n− 1
)
n− 2
n− 1 +
n1
n
1
n− 1 (7)
=
n1 − 1
n− 1
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In (5), equality follows by an argument analogous to that provided in the proof of Theorem 1. In
(6), equality follows from the fact that P(τ = t) = 1/(n − 1) for all t ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n}.47 In (7),
equality follows from using an application of Bayes rule to derive P(Xt = 1|τ = t), which satifies:
P(Xt = 1|τ = t) =

n−1
n−2
(
n1
n − 1n−1
)
for t = 2, . . . , n− 1
n1
n for t = n
(8)
In particular,
P(Xt = 1|τ = t) = P(τ = t|Xt−1 = 1, Xt = 1)P(Xt−1 = 1|Xt = 1)P(Xt = 1)P(τ = t)
= P(τ = t|Xt−1 = 1, Xt = 1)n1(n1 − 1)
n
(9)
where for all t, P(Xt−1 = 1|Xt = 1) = (n1 − 1)/(n − 1), which is the likelihood that relates to
sampling-without-replacement. For t < n, P(τ = t|Xt−1 = 1, Xt = 1), which is the likelihood that
relates to the arrangement of successes and failures, satisfies:
P(τ = t|Xt−1 = 1, Xt = 1) = E
[
1
M
∣∣∣∣ Xt−1 = 1, Xt = 1]
=
∑
x∈{0,1}
E
[
1
M
∣∣∣∣ Xt−1 = 1, Xt = 1, Xn = x]P(Xn = x|Xt−1 = 1, Xt = 1)
=
1
n1
n0
n− 2 +
1
n1 − 1
n1 − 2
n− 2
=
1
n− 2
(
n0
n1
+
n1 − 2
n1 − 1
)
where M := |I1(X)|, i.e. M = n1 −Xn. In the case that t = n, clearly P(τ = n|Xn−1 = 1, Xn =
1) = 1n1−1 .

Formulae for expected value of the proportion
The conditional expectation in Lemma 1 can be combined with P(N1(X) = n1|I1(X) 6= ∅) to
express the expected proportion in terms of just n and p.48
47Note that P(τ = t) =
∑
x:N1(x)=n1
P(τ = t|X = x)P(X = x) = ∑x:N1(x)=n1,xt−1=1 1n1−xn 1( nn1) =
1
( nn1)
[(
n−2
n1−1
)
1
n1
+
(
n−2
n1−2
)
1
n1−1
]
= 1
n−1 .
48In a comment written about this paper, Rinott and Bar-Hillel (2015) provide an alternative proof for this theorem.
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Theorem 2 Let n > 2 and 0 < p < 1. Then
E
[
Pˆ1(X)
∣∣∣ I1(X) 6= ∅ ] =
[
p− 1−(1−p)nn
]
n
n−1
1− (1− p)n−1 < p (10)
Proof: We first observe that in light of Lemma 1, Equation 10 can be written as follows:
E
[
Pˆ1(X)
∣∣∣ I1(X) 6= ∅ ] = E [E [ Pˆ1(X) ∣∣∣ I1(X) 6= ∅, N1(X) = n1 ]]
= E
[
N1(x)− 1
n− 1
∣∣∣∣ I1(X) 6= ∅ ]
The expected value can then be computed using the binomial distribution, which yields:
E
[
N1(x)− 1
n− 1
∣∣∣∣ I1(X) 6= ∅ ] = C n∑
n1=1
pn1(1− p)n−n1
[(
n
n1
)
− U(n, n1)
]
· n1 − 1
n− 1
=
∑n
n1=2
(
n
n1
)
pn1(1− p)n−n1 n1−1n−1
1− (1− p)n − p(1− p)n−1
=
1
n−1
[(
np− np(1− p)n−1)− (1− (1− p)n − np(1− p)n−1)]
1− (1− p)n − p(1− p)n−1
=
[
p− 1−(1−p)nn
]
n
n−1
1− (1− p)n−1
where U(n, n1) is the number of sequences with n1 successes for which the proportion is undefined,
and C is the constant that normalizes the total probability to 1. The second line follows because
U1(n, n1) = 0 for n1 > 1, U1(n, 0) = U1(n, 1) = 1, and C = 1/[1− (1− p)n − p(1− p)n−1].
Finally, by letting q := 1− p it is straightforward to show that the bias in Pˆ1(X) is negative:
E
[
Pˆ1(X)− p
∣∣∣ I1(X) 6= ∅ ] =
[
p− 1−qnn
]
n
n−1
1− qn−1 − p
=
(n− 1)(qn−1 − qn)− (q − qn)
(n− 1)(1− qn−1)
< 0
The inequality follows from f(x) = qx being strictly decreasing and convex, which implies that
q − qn > (n− 1)(qn−1 − qn).

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A.4 Expected difference in proportions
Let Dk be the difference in the probability of success when comparing trials that immediately
follow k consecutive successes with trials that immediately follow k consecutive failures. That is,
Dk := P(Xt = 1 |
∏t−1
j=t−kXj = 1) − P(Xt = 1 |
∏t−1
j=t−k(1 −Xj) = 1). An estimator of Dk that
is used in the hot hand fallacy literature (see Section 3) is Dˆk(x) := Pˆk(x) − [1 − Qˆk(X)], where
Qˆk(X) is the proportion of failures on the subset of trials that immediately follow k consecutive
failures, Jk(X) := {j :
∏j−1
i=j−k(1−Xi) = 1} ⊆ {k + 1, . . . , n}.
A.4.1 Proof of the bias in the difference
We extend the proof of Theorem 1 to show that Dˆk(X) is a biased estimator of Dk. Recall that
Ik(X) is the subset of trials that immediately follow k consecutive successes, i.e. Ik(X) := {i :∏i−1
j=i−kXj = 1} ⊆ {k + 1, . . . , n}. Analogously, let Jk(X) be the subset of trials that immediately
follow k consecutive failures, i.e. Jk(X) := {j :
∏j−1
i=j−k(1−Xi) = 1} ⊆ {k + 1, . . . , n}.
Theorem 3 Let X = {Xi}ni=1, n ≥ 3, be a sequence of independent Bernoulli trials, each with
probability of success 0 < p < 1. Let Pˆk(X) be the proportion of successes on the subset of trials
Ik(X) that immediately follow k consecutive successes, and Qˆk(X) be the proportion of failures on
the subset of trials Jk(X) that immediately follow k consecutive failures. Dˆk(x) := Pˆk(x) − [1 −
Qˆk(X)] is a biased estimator of Dk := P(Xt = 1 |
∏t−1
j=t−kXj = 1)−P(Xt = 1 |
∏t−1
j=t−k(1−Xj) =
1) ≡ 0 for all k such that 1 ≤ k < n/2. In particular,
E[ Dˆk(X) | Ik(X) 6= ∅, Jk(X) 6= ∅ ] < 0 (11)
Proof: Following the notation used in the proof of Theorem 1, let F := {x ∈ {0, 1}n : Ik(x) 6= ∅}
and G := {x ∈ {0, 1}n : Jk(x) 6= ∅}. We will show the following:
E[Dˆk(x)|F,G] = E[Pˆk(X)|F,G] + E[Qˆk(X)|F,G]− 1
= P(Xτ = 1|F,G) + P(Xσ = 0|F,G)− 1 (12)
< p+ (1− p)− 1 (13)
= 0 (14)
where in (12), as in the proof of Theorem 1, τ is a random draw from Ik(x) and σ is an analogous
random draw from Jk(x). In particular, we will demonstrate that the inequality in (13) holds by
showing that P(Xτ = 1|F,G) < p, which, by symmetry, implies that P(Xσ = 0|F,G) < 1− p.
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To show that P(Xτ = 1|F,G) < p we use an approach similar to that presented in the proof of
Theorem 1. In particular, note that P(Xτ = 1|F,G) =
∑n
t=k+1 P(Xt = 1|τ = t, F,G)P(τ = t|F,G),
and P(τ = t|F,G) > 0 for t ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n}. In what follows, we demonstrate that P(Xt = 1|τ =
t, F,G) < p when t < n, and that P(Xt = 1|τ = n, F,G) = p, which, taken together, guarantee
that P(Xτ = 1|F,G) < p.
First we observe that P(Xt = 1|τ = t, F,G) = P(Xt = 1|τ = t, Ft, G), where Ft := {x ∈ {0, 1}n :∏t−1
i=t−kxi = 1}. Bayes Rule then yields:
P(Xt = 1|τ = t, Ft, G)
P(Xt = 0|τ = t, Ft, G) =
P (τ = t, G |Xt = 1, Ft )
P (τ = t, G |Xt = 0, Ft )
P(Xt = 1|Ft)
P(Xt = 0|Ft)
=
P (τ = t, G |Xt = 1, Ft )
P (τ = t, G |Xt = 0, Ft )
p
1− p.
Therefore, for the case of t ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n − 1}, in order to show that P(Xt = 1|τ = t, F,G) =
P(Xt = 1|τ = t, Ft, G) < p it suffices to show that P(τ = t, G|Xt = 1, Ft) < P(τ = t, G|Xt = 0, Ft),
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which follows below:
P(τ = t, G|Xt = 0, Ft) =
∑
x∈Ft∩G:
xt=0
P(τ = t,X = x|Xt = 0, Ft)
=
∑
x∈Ft∩G:
xt=0
(1,x−t)∈Ft∩G
P(τ = t,X = x|Xt = 0, Ft) (15)
+
∑
x∈Ft∩G:
xt=0
(1,x−t)/∈Ft∩G
P(τ = t,X = x|Xt = 0, Ft)
≥
∑
x∈Ft∩G:
xt=0
(1,x−t)∈Ft∩G
P(τ = t,X = x|Xt = 0, Ft)
=
∑
x∈Ft∩G:
xt=0
(1,x−t)∈Ft∩G
P(τ = t|X = x, Xt = 0, Ft)P(X = x|Xt = 0, Ft)
=
∑
x∈Ft∩G:
xt=0
(1,x−t)∈Ft∩G
P(τ = t|Xt = 0,X−t = x−t, Ft)P(X−t = x−t|Xt = 0, Ft)
>
∑
x∈Ft∩G:
xt=0
(1,x−t)∈Ft∩G
P(τ = t|Xt = 1,X−t = x−t, Ft)P(X−t = x−t|Xt = 1, Ft)
(16)
=
∑
x∈Ft∩G:
xt=1
(1,x−t)∈Ft∩G
P(τ = t|X = x, Xt = 1, Ft)P(X = x|Xt = 1, Ft)
=
∑
x∈Ft∩G:
xt=1
P(τ = t,X = x|Xt = 1, Ft)
=P(τ = t, G|Xt = 1, Ft)
where in (15), given x, we define x−t := (x1, . . . , xt−1, xt+1, . . . , xn), and (b,x−t) := (x1, . . . , xt−1, b, xt+1, . . . , xn).49
The inequality in (16) follows for the same reason as the inequality in line (3) of Theorem 1. In
particular, P(X−t = x−t|Xt = 0, Ft) = P(X−t = x−t|Xt = 1, Ft) because X is a sequence of i.i.d.
Bernoulli trials, and P(τ = t|Xt = 1,X−t = x−t, Ft) < P(τ = t|Xt = 0,X−t = x−t, Ft) because τ
is drawn at random (uniformly) from the set Ik(x), which contains at least one more element (trial
t+ 1) if xt = 1 rather than xt = 0.
49Note that the second sum will have no terms for t ≥ n− k.
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For the case of t = n we follow the above steps until (16), at which point an equality now
emerges, as Xn = 1 no longer yields an additional trial from which to draw, because trial n is
terminal. This implies that P(τ = n|Xn = 1, Fn, G) = P(τ = n|Xn = 0, Fn, G).
Taking these two facts together: (i) P(Xt = 1|τ = t, F,G) < p, for k + 1 ≤ t < n, and (ii)
P(Xn = 1|τ = n, F,G) = p, it immediately follows that P(Xτ = 1|F,G) < p.

A.4.2 Formula for the expected difference in proportions (special case of k = 1)
In the case of k = 1 the expected difference in proportions admits a simple representation that is
independent of p.
Theorem 4 Let Dˆ1(X) := Pˆ1(X)− (1− Qˆ1(X)). If n > 2 and 0 < p < 1 then
E
[
Dˆ1(X)
∣∣∣ I1(X) 6= ∅, J1(X) 6= ∅ ] = − 1
n− 1
Proof: The method of proof is to first show that if n > 2 and 1 ≤ n1 ≤ n− 1 then:
E
[
Dˆ1(X)
∣∣∣ N1(X) = n1, I1(X) 6= ∅, J1(X) 6= ∅ ] = − 1
n− 1
which leaves us just one step from the desired result.
First, consider the case that 1 < n1 < n − 1. In this case Dˆ1(x) := Pˆ1(x) − (1 − Qˆ1(x)) is
defined for all sequences. Therefore, by the linearity of the expectation, and applying Lemma 1 to
Qˆ1(X) (by symmetry), we have:
E[Dˆ1(X)|N1(X) = n1] =E[Pˆ1(X)|N1(X) = n1]− E(1− Qˆ1(X)|N1(X) = n1]
=
n1 − 1
n− 1 −
(
1− n0 − 1
n− 1
)
=− 1
n− 1
If n1 = 1 then Dˆ1 is defined for all sequences that do not have a 1 in the final position; there are n−1
such sequences. The sequence with the 1 in the first position yields Dˆ1 = 0, while the other n− 2
sequences yield Dˆ1 = −1/(n− 2). Therefore, E
[
Dˆ1(X)
∣∣∣ N1(X) = 1, I1(X) 6= ∅, J1(X) 6= ∅ ] =
−1/(n− 1).
Now consider the case of n1 = n−1. The argument for this case is analogous, with Dˆ1 undefined
for the sequence with the zero in the last position, equal to 0 for the sequence with the zero in the
first position, and equal to −1/(n− 2) for all other sequences.
Finally, that the conditional expectation is independent ofN1(x) implies that E[D1(X) | I1(X) 6=
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Figure 4: For the expected difference in the proportion of successes, as a function of n, three values of k,
and various probabilities of success p, using the formula provided in Web Appendix E.2.
∅, J1(X) 6= ∅ ] is independent of p, yielding the result.

A.4.3 Quantifying the bias for the difference
Figure 4 contains a plot of E[ Dˆk(X) | Ik(X) 6= ∅, Jk(X) 6= ∅ ] as a function of the number of trials
n, and for k = 1, 2, and 3. Because the bias is dependent on p when k > 1, the difference is plotted
for various values of p. These expected differences are obtained from the formula provided in Web
Appendix E.2. The magnitude of the bias is simply the absolute value of the expected difference.
As with the bias in the proportion (see Figure 1), the bias in the difference is substantial even when
n is relatively large.
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B Appendix: Size of the bias when the DGP is hot hand/streak
shooting
In Section 3.3 the correction to GVT’s estimate of the hot hand effect (and test statistic) is based on
the magnitude of the bias under the assumption that the shooter has a fixed probability of success
(Bernoulli process). However, if the underlying data generating process (DGP) instead represents
hot hand or streak shooting, then the size of the bias changes. While many DGPs can produce
hot hand shooting, arguably the most natural are those discussed in Gilovich et al. (1985), as they
reflect lay conceptions of the hot hand and streak shooting. While GVT take no particular stance
on which lay definition is most appropriate, they do identify hot hand and streak shooting with:
(i) “non-stationarity” (the zone, flow, in the groove, in rhythm), and (ii) “positive association”
(success breeds success). We label (i) as a regime shift model, and interpret it as capturing the
idea that a player’s probability of success may increase due to some factor that is unrelated to
previous outcomes, so unobservable to the econometrician. This can be modeled naturally as a
hidden markov chain over the player’s (hidden) ability state. We label (ii) as a positive feedback
model, because it can be interpreted as capturing the idea that positive feedback from a player’s
previous shot outcomes can affect his/her subsequent probability of success. This can be modeled
naturally as an autoregressive process, or equivalently as a markov chain over shot outcomes.50
In Figure 5 we plot the bias in the estimator of the difference in probability of success when
on a hit streak rather than miss streak, Dˆ3, for three alternative DGPs, each of which admits the
Bernoulli process as a special case.51 The first panel corresponds to the “regime shift” DGP in which
the difference in the probability of success between the “hot” state and the “normal” state is given
by d (where d = 0 represents Bernoulli shooting),52 the second panel corresponds to the “positive
feedback” DGP in which hitting (missing) 3 shots in a row increases (decreases) the probability of
success by d/2, and the third panel corresponds to the “positive feedback (for hits)” DGP in which
positive feedback operates for hits only, making the probability of success increase by d whenever
50A positive feedback model need not be stationary.
51Each point is the output of a simulation with 10,000 repetitions of 100 trials from the DGP.
52In particular, let Q be the hidden markov chain over the “normal” state (n) and the “hot” state (h), where the
probability of success in the normal state is given by pn, and the probability of success in the hot state is given by
ph, with the shift in probability of success given by d := ph − pn
Q :=
(
qnn qnh
qhn qhh
)
Where qnn represents the probability of staying in the “normal” state, and qnh represents the probability of transi-
tioning from the “normal” to the “hot” state, etc. Letting pi = (pin, pih) be the stationary distribution, we find that
the magnitude of the bias is not very sensitive to variation in the stationary distribution and transition probabilities
within a plausible range (i.e. pih ∈ [.05, .2] and qhh ∈ (.8, .98)), while it varies greatly with the difference in probabil-
ities d and the overall expected shooting percentage p = pn +pihd. In the graph, for each d and p (FG%), we average
across values for the stationary distribution (pih) and transition probability (qhh).
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Figure 5: The bias for three types of hot hand and streak shooting data generating processes (DGPs), where
FG% is the expected overall field goal percentage from the DGP, and d represents the change in the player’s
underlying probability of success. When d = 0 each model reduces to a Bernoulli process. Therefore the black
line represents the bias in a Bernoulli proccess (n = 100 trials, k = 3).
3 hits in a row occurs. Within each panel of the figure, the bias, which is the expected difference
between Dˆ3, the estimator of the shift in the probability of success, and d, the true shift in the
probability of success, is depicted as a function of the expected overall shooting percentages (from
40 percent to 60 percent), for four true shifts in the underlying probability (d ∈ {.1, .2, .3, .4}).53
Observe that when the true DGP is a player with a hot hand, the bias is typically more severe,
or far more severe, than the bias associated with a Bernoulli DGP. In particular, the bias in the
“regime shift” model is particularly severe, which arises from two sources: (i) the bias discussed
in Section 2, and (ii) an attenuation bias, due to measurement error, as hitting 3 shots in a row
is an imperfect proxy for the “hot state.”54 The bias in the positive feedback DGP is uniformly
below the bias for a Bernoulli shooter. For the DGP in which positive feedback operates only for
hits, the bias is stronger than that of Bernoulli shooters for expected shooting percentages below
50 percent (as in GVTs data), and slightly less strong for shooting percentage above 50 percent.
As the true DGP is likely some combination of a regime shift and positive feedback, it is reasonable
to conclude that the empirical approach in Section 3.3 should be expected to (greatly) understate
the true magnitude of any underlying hot hand.
The intuition for why the introduction of regime shift elements increases the strength of the
bias so considerably is that if a player’s probability of success is not driven merely by feedback
from previous shots, but also by other time-varying player (and environment) specific factors, then
the act of hitting consecutive shots will serve as only a noisy proxy of the hot state, resulting in
measurement error, and an attenuation bias in the estimate. This type of measurement error is
53Results are similar if the DGP instead has negative feedback, i.e. d ∈ {−.1,−.2,−.3,−.4}.
54In practice observers may have more information than the econometrician (e.g. shooting mechanics, perceived confi-
dence, or lack thereof, etc.), so may be subject to less measurement error.
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similar to what Stone (2012) uncovered in the relationship between autocorrelation in outcomes
and autocorrelation in ability when considering a DGP that contains autocorrelation in ability.
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C Appendix: Additional analyses, and details for Section 3
C.1 An alternative (pooled) analysis of shooting data
An alternative approach to testing for streak shooting across players is to pool all shots from the
“3 hits” and “3 misses” categories (discarding the rest), then use a linear probability model to
estimate the effect of a shot falling in the “3-hits” category. If the implementation of GVT’s design
met the goal of placing each player in a position in which his or her probability of success is .5,
then this approach would be analogous to re-weighting the under-weighted coin flips in Table 1 of
Section 1. With 2515 shots, the bias is minimal and the estimate in this case is +17 percentage
points (p < .01, S.E. = 3.7). Because GVT’s design goal is difficult to implement in practice, this
approach will introduce an upward bias, due to aggregation, if the probability of success varies across
players. Adding fixed effects in a regression will control for this aggregation bias, but strengthens
the selection bias related to streaks.55 As a result, a bias correction is necessary. In this case, the
estimated effect is +13.9 percentage points (p < .01, S.E. = 5.8), which has larger standard errors
because the heteroscedasticity under the assumption of different player probabilities necessitates
the use of robust variants (in this case, Bell and McCaffrey standard errors, see Imbens and Kolesar
[2016]). The magnitude of the estimated effect has a different interpretation than the one given for
the estimate of the average difference across players; it should be thought of as the hot hand effect
for the average shot rather than the average player. This interpretation arises because pooling shots
across players generates an unbalanced panel, which results in the estimate placing greater weight
on the players that have taken more shots. As such, in the extreme it is even possible that the
majority of players exhibit a tendency to have fewer streaks than expected by chance, yet, because
they have generated relatively few observations, their data becomes diluted by many observations
from a single streak shooter.
C.2 Details on the hypothesis testing with the permutation test procedure
Let X ∈ {0, 1}n be a sequence of shot outcomes from some player, i. The null hypothesis is
that the shots are i.i.d. with P(Xt = 1) = pi. This implies that conditional on the number of
hits, N1(X) = n1, each rearrangement is equally likely. Considering only sequences for which both
Pˆ i(hit|k hits) and Pˆ i(hit|k misses) are defined, the hot hand hypothesis predicts that the difference
Pˆ i(hit|k hits)−Pˆ i(hit|k misses) will be significantly larger than what one would expect by chance.
Let Dˆk(X) be this difference for sequence X. For an observed sequence x, with N1(x) = n1 hits,
to test the null hypothesis at the α level, one simply checks if Dˆk(x) ≥ cα,n1 , where the critical
55In this panel regression framework, the bias from introducing fixed-effects is an example of an incidental parameter
problem of Neyman and Scott (1948), and is essentially equivalent to that discussed in Nerlove (1971) and Nick-
ell (1981), and itself is closely related to the bias in estimates of autocorrelation in time series mentioned in the
Introduction.
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value cα,n1 is defined as the smallest c such that P(Dk(X) ≥ c | H0, N1(X) = n1) ≤ α, and
the distribution P(Dk(X) ≥ c | H0, N1(X) = n1) is generated using the formula provided in
Web Appendix E.2. For the quantity P(Dk(X) ≥ c | H0, N1(X) = n1) it may be the case that
for some c∗, it is strictly greater than α for c ≤ c∗, and equal to 0 for c > c∗. In this case,
for any sequence with N1(X) = n1 one cannot reject H0 at an α level of significance. From the
ex ante perspective, a test of the hot hand at the α level of significance consists of a family of
such critical values {cα,n1}. It follows immediately that P(reject|H0) ≤ α because P(reject|H0) =∑n
n1=1
P(Dk(X) ≥ cα,n1 |H0, N1(X) = n1)P(N1(X) = n1|H0) ≤ α. Lastly, for any arbitrary test
statistic T (X), the fact that the distribution of X is exchangeable conditional on N1(X) = n1
means that P(T (X) ≥ c | H0, N1(X) = n1) can be approximated to appropriate precision with
Monte-Carlo permutations of the sequence x.
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D Web Appendix: Streak Selection Bias and a Quantitative Com-
parison to Sampling without Replacement
We show how the downward bias in the estimator Pˆk(X) is driven by two sources of selection bias.
One is related to sampling-without-replacement, and the other to the overlapping nature of streaks.
Recall from the proof of Theorem 1 that E
[
Pˆk(X)
∣∣∣ Ik(X) 6= ∅] = P(Xτ = 1|Ik(X) 6= ∅),
where τ is drawn (uniformly) at random from Ik(X). Because any sequence X ∈ {0, 1}n, such that
Ik(X) 6= ∅, that a researcher encounters will contain a certain number of successes N1(X) = n1
and failures n0 := n − n1, for n1 = k, . . . , n we can write P(Xτ = 1|Ik(X) 6= ∅) =
∑n
n1=k
P(Xτ =
1|N1(X) = n1, Ik(X) 6= ∅)P(N1(X) = n1|Ik(X) 6= ∅). To explore the nature of the downward bias
we discuss why P(Xτ = 1|N1(X) = n1, Ik(X)) < P(Xt = 1|N1(X) = n1) = n1/n, i.e. why the
probability that a randomly drawn trial from Ik(X) is less than the overall proportion of successes
in the sequence pˆ = n1/n, i.e. the prior probability that a trial is a success when it is drawn
(uniformly) at random from 1, . . . , n under the knowledge that N1(X) = n1.
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Suppose that the researcher were to know the overall proportion of successes pˆ = n1/n in the
sequence. Now, consider the following two ways of learning that trial t immediately follows k
consecutive successes: (i) a trial τN , drawn uniformly at random from {k+ 1, . . . , n} is revealed to
be trial τN = t, and preceded by k consecutive successes, or (ii) a trial τI , drawn (uniformly) at
random from Ik(X) = {i :
∏t−1
i=t−kXi = 1} ⊆ {k + 1, . . . , n} is revealed to be trial τI = t. In each
case, the prior probability of success is P(Xt = 1) = n1/n, which can be equivalently represented
with the odds ratio P(Xt = 1)/P(Xt = 0) = n1/n0, indicates the n1/n0 : 1 prior odds in favor of
Xt = 1 (relative to Xt = 0).
In the first case the probability distribution for τN is given by P(τN = t) = 1/(n − k) for all
t ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n}, and is independent of X. Upon finding out that τN = t one then learns that∏t−1
t−kXi = 1. As a result, the posterior odds can be represented by a sampling-without-replacement
formula, via Bayes rule:
56Note that P(N1(X) = n1|Ik(X) 6= ∅) > P(N1(X) = n1) because the exclusion of sequences without a streak of k
successes in the first n− 1 trials biases upwards the number of successes. We do not consider this upward bias here
as Theorem 1 shows that the downward biases predominate.
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P(Xt = 1|τN = t)
P(Xt = 0|τN = t) =
P(Xt = 1,
∏t−1
t−kXi = 1|τN = t)
P(Xt = 0,
∏t−1
t−kXi = 1|τN = t)
=
P(τN = t|Xt = 1,
∏t−1
t−kXi = 1)
P(τN = t|Xt = 0,
∏t−1
t−kXi = 1)
P(
∏t−1
t−kXi = 1|Xt = 1)
P(
∏t−1
t−kXi = 1|Xt = 0)
P(Xt = 1)
P(Xt = 0)
=
P(
∏t−1
t−kXi = 1|Xt = 1)
P(
∏t−1
t−kXi = 1|Xt = 0)
P(Xt = 1)
P(Xt = 0)
=
n1−1
n−1 × · · · × n1−kn−k
n1
n−1 × · · · × n1−k+1n−k
n1
n0
=
n1 − k
n1
n1
n0
=
n1 − k
n0
Observe that the prior odds in favor of success are attenuated by the likelihood ratio n1−kn1 of
producing k consecutive successes given either hypothetical state of the world: Xt = 1 or Xt = 0,
respectively. That this is a sampling-without-replacement effect can be made most transparent by
re-expressing the posterior odds as n1−kn−k /
n0
n−k .
57,58
In the second case, the probability that τI = t is drawn from Ik(X) is completely determined
by M := |Ik(X)|, and equal to 1/M . Upon learning that τI = t one can infer the following three
things: (i) Ik(X) 6= ∅, i.e. M ≥ 1, which is informative if n1 ≤ (k − 1)(n − n1) + k, (ii) t is a
member of Ik(X), and (iii)
∏t−1
t−kXi = 1, as in sampling-without-replacement. As a result, the
57The numerator is the probability of drawing a 1 at random from an urn containing n1 1’s and n0 0’s, once k 1’s (and
no 0’s) have been removed from the urn. The denominator is the probability of drawing a 0 from the same urn.
58This effect calls to mind the key behavioral assumption made in Rabin (2002), that believers in the law of small
numbers view outcomes from an i.i.d. process as if they were instead generated by random draws without replacement.
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posterior odds can be determined via Bayes Rule in the following way:
P(Xt = 1|τI = t)
P(Xt = 0|τI = t) =
P(Xt = 1,
∏t−1
t−kXi = 1,M ≥ 1|τI = t)
P(Xt = 0,
∏t−1
t−kXi = 1,M ≥ 1|τI = t)
=
P(τI = t|Xt = 1,
∏t−1
t−kXi = 1,M ≥ 1)
P(τI = t|Xt = 0,
∏t−1
t−kXi = 1,M ≥ 1)
P(Xt = 1,
∏t−1
t−kXi = 1,M ≥ 1)
P(Xt = 0,
∏t−1
t−kXi = 1,M ≥ 1)
=
P(τI = t|Xt = 1,
∏t−1
t−kXi = 1)
P(τI = t|Xt = 0,
∏t−1
t−kXi = 1)
P(
∏t−1
t−kXi = 1|Xt = 1)
P(
∏t−1
t−kXi = 1|Xt = 0)
P(Xt = 1)
P(Xt = 0)
(17)
=
E
[
1
M
∣∣ ∏t−1
t−kXi = 1, Xt = 1
]
E
[
1
M
∣∣ ∏t−1
t−kXi = 1, Xt = 0
] P(∏t−1t−kXi = 1|Xt = 1)
P(
∏t−1
t−kXi = 1|Xt = 0)
P(Xt = 1)
P(Xt = 0)
=
E
[
1
M
∣∣ ∏t−1
t−kXi = 1, Xt = 1
]
E
[
1
M
∣∣ ∏t−1
t−kXi = 1, Xt = 0
] n1 − k
n1
n1
n0
(18)
For first term in (17) the event M ≥ 1 is dropped from the conditional argument because it is
implied by the event
∏t−1
t−kXi = 1, and the term
P(M≥1|Xt=1,
∏t−1
t−kXi=1)
P(M≥1|Xt=0,
∏t−1
t−kXi=1)
does not appear because it
is equal to 1.
Equation 18 gives the posterior odds P(Xt=1|τI=t)P(Xt=0|τI=t) in favor of observing Xt = 1 (relative to
Xt = 0), for a representative trial τ = t drawn at random from Ik(X). Observe that the prior odds
ratio n1/n0 is multiplied by two separate updating factors, which we now discuss.
The first updating factor n1−kn1 is clearly strictly less than one and reflects the restriction that
the finite number of available successes places on the procedure for selecting trials into Ik(X).
In particular, it can be thought of as the information provided upon learning that k of the n1
successes are no longer available, which leads to a sampling-without-replacement effect on the prior
odds n1/n0. Clearly, the attenuation in the odds due to this factor increases in the streak length k.
The second updating factor
E [ 1M | ∏t−1t−kXi=1,Xt=1]
E [ 1M | ∏t−1t−kXi=1,Xt=0] < 1, for t < n, reflects an additional re-
striction that the arrangement of successes and failures in the sequence places on the procedure for
selecting trials into Ik(X). It can be thought of as the additional information provided by learning
that the k successes, which are no longer available, are consecutive and immediately precede t. To
see why the odds are further attenuated in this case, we begin with the random variable M , which
is defined as the number of trials in Ik(X). The probability of any particular trial t ∈ Ik(X) being
selected at random is 1/M . Now, because the expectation in the numerator conditions on Xt = 1,
this means that 1/M is expected to be smaller in the numerator than in the denominator, where
the expectation instead conditions on Xt = 0. The reason why is that for a sequence in which
Xt = 1 the streak of 1’s continues on, meaning that trial t + 1 must also be in Ik(X), and trials
t + 2 through t + k each may also be in Ik(X). By contrast, for a sequence in which Xt = 0 the
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streak of 1’s ends, meaning that trials t+ 1 through t+ k cannot possibly be in Ik(X), which leads
the corresponding 1/M to be smaller in expectation.59 This last argument provides intuition for
why the attenuation of the odds due to this factor increases in k.
Interestingly, for the special case of k = 1,
E [ 1M | xt−1=1,xt=1]
E [ 1M | xt−1=1,xt=0] = 1−
1
(n−1)(n1−1) < 1 when t < n,
and
E [ 1M | xn−1=1,xn=1]
E [ 1M | xn−1=1,xn=0] =
n1
n1−1 > 1 when t = n.
60 These contrasting effects combine to yield the
familiar sampling-without-replacement formula:
E
[
Pˆ1(X)
∣∣∣ I1(X) 6= ∅, N1(X) = n1 ] = n1 − 1
n− 1 (19)
as demonstrated in Lemma 1, in Appendix A.3. On the other hand, when k > 1 the bias is
substantially stronger than sampling-without-replacement (see Figure 6), though the formula does
not appear to admit a simple representation. For further discussion on the relationship between
the bias, sampling-without-replacement, and the overlapping words paradox (Guibas and Odlyzko
1981) see Web Appendix F.
A quantitative comparison with sampling-without-replacement
For the general case, in which pˆ = n1/n is unknown, juxtaposing the bias with sampling-without-
replacement puts the magnitude of the bias into context. Let the probability of success be given by
p = P(Xt = 1). In Figure 6, the expected empirical probability that a randomly drawn trial in Ik(X)
is a success, which is the expected proportion, E[Pˆk(X) | Ik(X) 6= ∅], is plotted along with the
expected value of the probability that a randomly drawn trial t ∈ {1, . . . , n}\Tk is a success, given
that the k success trials Tk ⊆ {1, . . . , n} have already been drawn from the sequence (sampling-
without-replacement), E
[
N1(X)−k
n−k
∣∣∣N1(X) ≥ k]. The plot is generated using the combinatorial
results discussed in Section 2.1. Note that in the case of k = 1, the bias is identical to sampling-
without-replacement, as shown in Equation 19.61 Observe that for k > 1, and n not too small, the
59This is under the assumption that t ≤ n − k. In general, the event Xt = 0 excludes the next min{k, n − t} trials
from t+ 1 to min{t+ k, n} from being selected, while the event Xt = 1 leads trial t+ 1 to be selected, and does not
exclude the next min{k, n− t} − 1 trials from being selected.
60The likelihood ratios can be derived following the proof of Lemma 1 in Appendix A.3. In particular, for the equivalent
likelihood ratio,
P(τ=t|xt−1=1,xt=1)
P(τ=t|xt−1=1,xt=0) , the approach used to derive the numerator can also be used to show that the
denominator is equal to 1
n−2
(
n0−1
n1
+ n1−1
n1−1
)
. Further, in the case of t = n, it is clear that P(τ = n|xn−1 = 1, xn =
0) = 1
n1
. Each likelihood ratio then follows from dividing and collecting terms.
61This appears to contradict equation 18, i.e. that the bias in the procedure used to select the subset of trials I1k(X),
is stronger than sampling-without-replacement for t < n, whereas it is non-existent (thus weaker) for t = n. This
disparity is due to the second updating factor, which relates to the arrangement. It turns out that for k = 1, the
determining aspect of the arrangement that influences this updating factor is whether or not the final trial is a success,
as this determines the number of successes in the first n− 1 trials, where M = n1−Xn. If one were to instead fix M
rather than n1, then sampling-without-replacement relative to the number of successes in the first n− 1 trials would
be an accurate description of the mechanism behind the bias, and it induces a negative dependence between any two
trials within the first n − 1 trials of the sequence. Therefore, it is sampling-without-replacement with respect to M
that determines the bias when k = 1.
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Figure 6: The dotted lines correspond to the bias from sampling-without-replacement. It is the expected
probability of a success, given that k successes are first removed from the sequence (assuming p = .5). The
solid lines correspond to the expected proportion from Figure 1.
bias in the expected proportion is considerably larger than the corresponding bias from sampling-
without-replacement.
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E Web Appendix: The Formula Used to Generate the Sampling
Distribution and Calculate Expectations
We describe the formula used to build the exact sampling distribution of the proportion, and
difference in proportions, from which we calculate expectations and plot histograms.
E.1 Proportion
Given n trials and streaks of length k, we observe that the proportion of successes on the trials
that immediately follow k consecutive success Pˆk(x) can be represented simply as the the number
of successes on trials that immediately follow a streak of k consecutive successes divided by the
total number of trials—i.e. failures and success—that immediately follow a streak of k consecutive
successes. In particular, for a sequence x ∈ {0, 1}n of successes and failures, we have:
Pˆk(x) =
M1(x)
M0(x) +M1(x)
where M0(x) := |{i ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n} : (1 − xi)
∏i−1
j=i−k xj = 1}| is the number of failures that
immediately follow k consecutive successes (suppressing the k to ease notation). Similarly, the
number of successes that immediately follow k consecutive successes is defined as M1(x) := {i ∈
{k + 1, . . . , n} : xi
∏i−1
j=i−k xj = 1}. Finally, the expected value of Pˆk(x) is uniquely determined by
the joint distribution of counts P( (M0(X),M1(X)) = (m0,m1) ).
The algorithm described below (recursively) constructs the exact joint distribution of counts, by
associating each unique count realization, which we call a key, with its corresponding probability.62
In general, for a sequence of length n and a streak of length k this joint distribution can be repre-
sented as a dictionary of (key:probability) pairs D := (m : pD(m))m∈Dc , where m := (m0,m1) is
a unique pair, Dc corresponds to the set of count realizations with non-zero probability, i.e.
Dc := {m ∈ N2 | pD(m) > 0}
and pD(m) := P( (M0(X),M1(X)) = (m0,m1) ).
Table 3 reports the distribution over the sample space of sequences, and the corresponding
dictionary, for the simple case of n = 3 and k = 1. From the dictionary one can derive the sampling
62This algorithm, which builds upon an algorithm suggested by Michael J. Wiener, replaces an exact formula based on
the joint distribution of runs of various lengths that we derived in a previous working paper version of this manuscript.
The previous formula, while numerically tractable, was less efficient.
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Table 3: In the table to the left column one lists the sample space of eight possible sequence realizations
from three trials. Column two lists the number of (failures, successes) that immediately follow a success. The
third column lists the probability with which the sequence occurs, where p is the probability of success and q
is the probability of failure. In the table to the right the joint distribution is represented as a dictionary of
count-probability pairs. Each unique count m = (m0,m1) has a unique associated probability equal to the
sum of the probabilities of all sequences with the same associated count (see the table on the left).
Sample Space of sequences
sequence probability count
000 q3 (0, 0)
001 q2p (0, 0)
010 q2p (1, 0)
100 q2p (1, 0)
011 qp2 (0, 1)
101 qp2 (1, 0)
110 qp2 (1, 1)
111 p3 (0, 2)
Dictionary
count probability
m : pD(m)
(0, 0) : q2
(1, 0) : (q + q2)p
(0, 1) : qp2
(1, 1) : qp2
(0, 2) : p3
distribution of the proportion and directly compute the expected proportion:
E[Pˆk(x)|Ik(x) 6= ∅] =
∑
m∈D∗c
m1
m0 +m1
p∗D(m)
where D∗c = Dc \ {(0, 0)} and p∗D(m) := pD(m)/
∑
m′∈D∗c pD(m
′)
Let D(`, r) be the dictionary that represents the count-probability pairs for the remaining r
trials of a sequence that has ` ≤ k consecutive successes immediately preceding the current trial.
For example, if k = 2 then D(0, 0) = D(1, 0) = D(2, 0) = ((0, 0) : 1), as when zero trials remain
in the sequence the only count possible is (0,0), which occurs with probability 1. Also note that
D(1, 1) = ((0, 0) : 1), D(2, 1) = ((1, 0) : q, (0, 1) : p), and D(2, 2) = ((1, 0) : q, (1, 1) : pq, (0, 2) : p2),
as a trial can only be counted as a fail or success if it is immediately preceded by ` = k = 2
consecutive successes. The key observation is that given the initial condition D(`, 0) = ((0, 0) : 1)
for 0 ≤ ` ≤ k, the dictionaries D(`, r) can be defined recursively for r > 0 and 0 ≤ ` ≤ k, and take
the following form:
D(`, r) =
D(0, r − 1)(0,0):q unionmultiD(`+ 1, r − 1)(0,0):p, if ` < kD(0, r − 1)(1,0):q unionmultiD(k, r − 1)(0,1):p, if ` = k
where: (i) the operation Dm
′:p′ := (m+m′ : pD(m)× p′)m∈Dc increments each count m with the
addition of m′, and scales its corresponding probability pD(m) by the probability p′ of the incre-
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ment, and (ii) given the dictionaries A and B, the operation AunionmultiB := (m : (pA + pB)(m))m∈Ac∪Bc
defines the union of two dictionaries as the union of their counts, where the corresponding probabil-
ities for a key that appears in both dictionaries are summed together (we assume that pA(m) = 0
for m /∈ Ac; also for B). If a trial is immediately preceded by ` < k consecutive successes, then with
probability q (p) the next trial to its right will be immediately preceded by 0 (` + 1) consecutive
successes; regardless of the outcome of the trial, m′ = (0, 0) additional failures and successes will
be counted as immediately preceded by k successes and r − 1 trials will remain. If, on the other
hand, a trial is immediately preceded by ` = k consecutive successes (and there is at least one trial
remaining, i.e. r > 0), then with probability q (p) the next trial to its right will be immediately
preceded by 0 (k) consecutive successes and we will count m′ = (1, 0) ((0, 1)) additional failures
and successes; regardless of the outcome of the trial, r − 1 trials will remain.
The algorithm that follows describes the complete recursive procedure.
Algorithm 1: Recursive formula that builds the collection of dictionaries D. Of interest are
the dictionaries D(0, n) for n = k + 1, . . . , N which correspond to the joint distribution of
the total number of (successes, failures) that immediately follow k consecutive successes in n
trials.
1 Function Count Distribution(N , k, p):
/* For the definition of D(`, r), Am
′:p′ and A unionmultiB below, see text. */
2 q ← 1− p
3 for n = 0, . . . , N do
4 L← min{k, n}
5 for ` = L, . . . , 0 do
6 r ← n− `
7 if r = 0 then
8 D(`, r)← ((0, 0) : 1)
9 else if r > 0 then
10 if ` < k then
11 D(`, r)← D(0, r − 1)(0,0):q unionmultiD(`+ 1, r − 1)(0,0):p
12 else if ` = k then
13 D(`, r)← D(0, r − 1)(1,0):q unionmultiD(k, r − 1)(0,1):p
14 end
15 end
16 return D
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E.2 Difference in Proportions
The difference in proportions can be computed from a dictionary D := (m : pD(m))m∈Dc , where
Dc corresponds to the set of count realizations with non-zero probability i.e.
Dc := {m ∈ N4 | pD(m) > 0}
and pD(m) := P( (M00 (X),M10 (X),M01 (X),M11 (X)) = (m00,m10,m01,m11) ). The variables M01 (X)
and M11 (X) yield the total number of failures and successes (respectively) on those trials that
immediately follow a streak of k successes, whereas M00 (X) and M
1
0 (X) yield the total number of
failures and successes (respectively) on those trials that immediately follow a streak of k failures.
Let D(`0, `1, r) be the dictionary that represents the count-probability pairs for the remaining r
trials of a sequence in which there are `0 ≤ k consecutive failures and `1 ≤ k consecutive successes
on the immediately preceding trials (so that `0`1 = 0). These dictionaries can be constructed
recursively in a way similar to that shown in Web Appendix E.1:
D(`0, `1, r) =

D(`0 + 1, 0, r − 1)(0,0,0,0):q unionmultiD(0, `1 + 1, r − 1)(0,0,0,0):p, if max{`0, `1} < k
D(k, 0, r − 1)(1,0,0,0):q unionmultiD(0, 1, r − 1)(0,1,0,0):p, if `0 = k
D(1, 0, r − 1)(0,0,1,0):q unionmultiD(0, k, r − 1)(0,0,0,1):p, if `1 = k
See supplementary materials for the corresponding code.
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F Web Appendix: The relationship between the streak selection
bias and known biases and paradoxes
F.1 Sampling-without-replacement and the bias for streaks of length k = 1.
A brief inspection of Table 1 in Section 1 reveals how the dependence between the first n−1 flips in
the sequence arises. In particular, when the coin is flipped three times, the number of Hs in the first
2 flips determines the number of observations of flips that immediately follow an H. Because TT
must be excluded, the first two flips will consist of one of three equally likely sequences: HT, TH or
HH. For the two sequences with a single H—HT and TH—if a researcher were to find an H within
the first two flips of the sequence and then select the adjacent flip for inspection, the probability
of heads on the adjacent flip would be 0, which is strictly less than the overall proportion of heads
in the sequence. This can be thought of as a sampling-without-replacement effect. More generally,
across the three sequences, HT, TH, and HH, the expected probability of the adjacent flip being a
heads is (0 + 0 + 1)/3 = 1/3. This probability reveals the (negative) sequential dependence that
exists between the first two flips of the sequence. Further, the same negative dependence holds
for any two flips in the first n − 1 flips of a sequence of length n, regardless of their positions.
Thus, when k = 1 it is neither time’s arrow nor the arrangement of flips within the sequence that
determines the bias.
This same sampling-without-replacement feature also underlies a classic form of selection bias
known as Berkson’s bias (aka Berkson’s paradox). Berkson (1946) presented a hypothetical study of
the relationship between two diseases that, while not associated in the general population, become
negatively associated in the population of hospitalized patients. The cause of the bias is subtle:
patients are hospitalized only if they have at least one of the two particular diseases. To illustrate,
assume that someone from the general population has a given disease (Y=“Yes”) or does not
(N=“No”), with equal chances. Just as in the coin flip example, anyone with neither disease (NN)
is excluded, while a patient within the hospital population must have one of the three equally likely
profiles: YN, NY, or YY. Thus, just as with the coin flips, the probability of a patient having
another disease, given that he already has one disease, is 1/3.
The same sampling-without replacement feature again arises in several classic conditional prob-
ability paradoxes. For example, in the Monty Hall problem the game show host inspects two
doors, which can together be represented as one of three equally likely sequences GC, CG, or GG
(G=“Goat,” C=“Car”), then opens one of the G doors from the realized sequence. Thus, the host
effectively samples G without replacement (Nalebuff 1987; Selvin 1975; Vos Savant 1990).63
63The same structure also appears in what is known as the boy-or-girl paradox (Miller and Sanjurjo 2015a). A slight
modification of the Monty-Hall problem makes it identical to the coin flip bias presented in Table 1 (see Miller and
Sanjurjo [2015a]).
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Sampling-without-replacement also underlies a well-known finite sample bias that arises in stan-
dard estimates of autocorrelation in time series data (Shaman and Stine 1988; Yule 1926). This
interpretation of finite sample bias, which does not appear to have been previously noted, allows
one to see how this bias is closely related to those above. To illustrate, let x be a randomly
generated sequence consisting of n trials, each of which is an i.i.d. draw from some continuous
distribution with finite mean and variance. For a researcher to compute the autocorrelation she
must first determine its sample mean x¯ and variance σˆ2(x), then calculate the autocorrelation
ρˆt,t+1(x) = ˆcovt,t+1(x)/σˆ
2(x), where ˆcovt,t+1(x) is the autocovariance.
64 The total sum of values
nx¯ in a sequence serves as the analogue to the number of Hs (or Gs/Ys) in a sequence in the
examples given above. Given nx¯, the autocovariance can be represented as the expected outcome
from a procedure in which one draws (at random) one of the n trial outcomes xi, and then takes
the product of its difference from the mean (xi − x¯), and another trial outcome j’s difference from
the mean. Because the outcome’s value xi is essentially drawn from nx¯, without replacement,
the available sum total (nx¯ − xi) is averaged across the remaining n − 1 outcomes, which im-
plies that the expected value of another outcome j’s (j 6= i) difference from the mean is given by
E[xj |xi, x¯] − x¯ = (nx¯ − xi)/(n − 1) − x¯ = (x¯ − xi)/(n − 1). Therefore, given xi − x¯, the expected
value of the product (xi − x¯)(xj − x¯) must equal (xi − x¯)(x¯ − xi)/(n − 1) = −(xi − x¯)2/(n − 1),
which is independent of j. Because xi and j were selected at random, this implies that the ex-
pected autocorrelation, given x¯ and σˆ2(x), is equal to −1/(n− 1) for all x¯ and σˆ2(x). This result
accords with known results on the O(1/n) bias in discrete-time autoregressive processes (Shaman
and Stine 1988; Yule 1926), and happens to be identical to the result in Theorem 4 for the expected
difference in proportions (see Appendix A.3). In the context of time series regression this bias is
known as the Hurwicz bias (Hurwicz 1950), which is exacerbated when one introduces fixed effects
into a time series model with a small number of time periods (Nerlove 1967, 1971; Nickell 1981).65,66
64The autocovariance is given by ˆcovt,t+1(x) :=
1
n−1
∑n−1
i=1 (xi − x¯)(xi+1 − x¯).
65The bias that is exacerbated by the introduction of of exogenous variables is commonly known as the “Nickell bias,”
which was first explored by simulation by Nerlove (1967, 1971). It is an example of what is known as the incidental
parameter problem (Lancaster 2000; Neyman and Scott 1948).
66In a comment on this paper, Rinott and Bar-Hillel (2015) assert that the work of Bai (1975) (and references therein)
demonstrate that the bias in the proportion of successes on the trials that immediately follow a streak of k or more
successes follows directly from known results on the finite sample bias of Maximum Likelihood estimators of transition
probabilities in Markov chains, as independent Bernoulli trials can be represented by a Markov chain with each state
defined by the sequence of outcomes in the previous k trials. While it is true that the MLE of the corresponding
transition matrix is biased, and correct to note the relationship in this sense, the cited theorems do not indicate the
direction of the bias, and in any event do not directly apply in the present case because they require that transition
probabilities in different rows of the transition matrix not be functions of each other, and not be equal to zero, a
requirement which does not hold in the corresponding transition matrix. Instead, an unbiased estimator of each
transition probability will exist, and will be a function of the overall proportion.
47
F.2 Pattern overlap and the bias for streaks of length k > 1.
In Figure 6 of Web Appendix D we compare the magnitude of the bias in the (conditional) expected
proportion to the pure sampling-without-replacement bias, in a sequence of length n. As can be
seen, the magnitude of the bias in the expected proportion is nearly identical to that of sampling-
without-replacement for k = 1. However, for the bias in the expected proportion, the relatively
stronger sampling-without-replacement effect that operates within the first n − 1 terms of the
sequence is balanced by the absence of bias for the final term.67 On the other hand, for k > 1 the bias
in the expected proportion is considerably stronger than the pure sampling-without-replacement
bias. One intuition for this is provided in the discussion of the updating factor in Section D. Here
we discuss another intuition, which has to do with the overlapping nature of the selection criterion
when k > 1, which is related to what is known as the overlapping words paradox (Guibas and
Odlyzko 1981).
For simplicity, assume that a sequence is generated by n = 5 flips of a fair coin. For the simple
case in which streaks have length k = 1, the number of flips that immediately follow a heads is equal
to the number of instances of H in the first n− 1 = 4 flips. For any given number of Hs in the first
four flips, say three, if one were to sample an H from the sequence and then examine an adjacent
flip (within the first four flips), then because any H could have been sampled, across all sequences
with three Hs in the first four flips, any H appearing within the first four flips is given equal weight
regardless of the sequence in which it appears. The exchangeability of outcomes across equally
weighted sequences with an H in the sampled position (and three Hs overall) therefore implies
that for any other flip in the first four flips of the sequence, the probability of an H is equal to
3−1
4−1 =
2
3 , regardless of whether or not it is an adjacent flip. On the other hand, for the case of
streaks of length k = 2, the number of opportunities to observe a flip that immediately follows two
consecutive heads is equal to the number of instances of HH in the first 4 flips. Because the pattern
HH can overlap with itself, whereas the pattern H cannot, then for a sequence with three Hs, if
one were to sample an HH from the sequence and examine an adjacent flip within the first 4 flips,
it is not the case that any two of the Hs from the sequence can be sampled. For example, in the
sequence HHTH only the first two Hs can be sampled. Because the sequences HHTH and HTHH
each generate just one opportunity to sample, this implies that the single instance of HH within
each of these sequences is weighted twice as much as any of the two (overlapping) instances of HH
within the two sequences HHHT and THHH that each allow two opportunities to sample, despite
the fact that each sequence has three heads in the first four flips. This implies that, unlike in the
case of k = 1, when sampling an instance of HH from a sequence with three heads in the first four
flips, the remaining outcomes H and T are no longer exchangeable, as the arrangements HHTH
67The reason for this is provided in the alternative proof of Lemma 1 in Appendix A.3
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and HTHH, in which every adjacent flip within the first four flips is a tails, must be given greater
weight than the arrangements HHHT and THHH, in which half of the adjacent flips are heads.
This consequence of pattern overlap is closely related to the overlapping words paradox, which
states that for a sequence (string) of finite length n, the probability that a pattern (word) appears,
e.g. HTTHH , depends not only on the length of the pattern relative to the length of the sequence,
but also on how the pattern overlaps with itself (Guibas and Odlyzko 1981).68 For example, while
the expected number of (potentially overlapping) occurrences of a particular two flip pattern—
TT, HT,TH or HH—in a sequence of four flips of a fair coin does not depend on the pattern,
it’s probability of occurrence does.69 The pattern HH can overlap with itself, so can have up to
three occurrences in a single sequence (HHHH), whereas the pattern HT cannot overlap with itself,
so can have at most two occurrences (HTHT). Because the expected number of occurrences of
each pattern must be equal, this implies that the pattern HT is distributed across more sequences,
meaning that any given sequence is more likely to contain this pattern.70
68For a simpler treatment which studies a manifestation of the paradox in the non-transitive game known as “Penney’s”
game, see Konold (1995) and Nickerson (2007).
69That all fixed length patterns are equally likely ex-ante is straightforward to demonstrate. For a given pat-
tern of heads and tails of length `, (y1, . . . , y`), the expected number of occurrences of this pattern satisfies
E[
∑n
i=` 1[(Xi−`+1,...,Xi)=(y1,...,y`)]] =
∑n
i=`E[1[(Xi−`+1,...,Xi)=(y1,...,y`)]] =
∑n
i=` 1/2
` = (n− `+ 1)/2`.
70Note that the proportion of heads on flips that immediately follow two consecutive heads can be written as the
number of (overlapping) HHH instances in n flips, divided by the number of (overlapping) HH instances in the first
n− 1 flips.
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